From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 13 Feb 2005 13:26:39 +0200
Subject: [UNIX] IBM AIX netpmon Local Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
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IBM AIX netpmon Local Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The netpmon program is "a setuid root application, installed by default
under multiple versions of IBM AIX, which can be used to monitor activity
and report statistics on network I/O and network-related CPU usage".
Local exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in the netpmon
command included by default in multiple versions of IBM Corp.'s AIX
Operating System could allow for arbitrary code execution as the root
user.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* IBM AIX version 5.2 and prior
Immune Systems:
*
The vulnerability specifically exists due to an unbounded string copying
operation into stack memory. When provided with a long argument to the -O
option (the ReportType option), the netpmon process will overwrite stack
memory. This allows for the execution of arbitrary code by overwriting the
saved return address.
Analysis:
Exploitation of this vulnerability is simple for a skilled attacker,
however gid "system" is required in order to execute the vulnerable
binary. Successful exploitation yields root access to the system.
Workaround:
Only allow trusted users local access to security critical systems; only
allow trusted users access to the "system" group. Alternately, remove the
setuid bit from netpmon using chmod u-s /usr/bin/netpmon
Vendor Status:
Vendor advisories for this issue are available at:
* For AIX 5.1:
<https://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/pseries.subscriptionSvcs?mode=1&heading=AIX51&topic=SECURITY&month=ALL> AIX 5.1 Security Advisories
* For AIX 5.2:
<https://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/pseries.subscriptionSvcs?mode=1&heading=AIX52&topic=SECURITY&month=ALL> AIX 5.2 Security Advisories
* For AIX 5.3:
<https://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/pseries.subscriptionSvcs?mode=1&heading=AIX53&topic=SECURITY&month=ALL> AIX 5.3 Security Advisories
Disclosure Timeline:
12/21/2004 - Initial vendor notification
01/07/2004 - Initial vendor response
02/10/2005 - Coordinated public disclosure
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com.> iDEFENSE.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=197&type=vulnerabilities> http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=197&type=vulnerabilities
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