From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 23 Aug 2006 10:26:20 +0200
Subject: [NT] IBM eGatherer ActiveX Code Execution Vulnerability
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IBM eGatherer ActiveX Code Execution Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
eEye Digital Security has discovered a security vulnerability in IBM's
eGatherer ActiveX control. This is the second vulnerability found in this
control by eEye Research, the first being from Drew Copley
<http://www.eeye.com/html/research/advisories/AD20040615B.html>;
http://www.eeye.com/html/research/advisories/AD20040615B.html. This
control is typically installed by default on IBM workstations and laptops,
and is used by default for auto-finding drivers/updates on IBM's/Lenovo's
support site.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* eGatherer ActiveX control versions prior to 3.20.0284.0
Immune Systems:
* eGatherer ActiveX control version 3.20.0284.0
IBM / Lenovo describes this ActiveX control as follows:
"The auto-detect feature automatically finds your system's machine-type,
model, and serial number to help you get the files and information you
need quickly and easily. It does not collect any personal information or
compromise the security of your system in any way."
Despite their promise for not "compromising the security of the system in
any way", a buffer overflow exists within the handling of a parameter of
the ActiveX control that would allow a remote attacker to reliably
overwrite the stack with arbitrary data and execute arbitrary code through
the web browser with the privileges of the logged in users.
Technical Details:
The vulnerability exists within the RunEgatherer function within the
ActiveX. This method accepts one function, the specified file name for the
eGatherer log output. It should be noted that even when setting the
parameter with legitimate paths for output, the ActiveX remains to only
write the log file to the SystemDrive. By filling the single parameter
with a large string, a straight stack overflow occurs. The following
sample would reproduce the crash for vulnerable ActiveX controls:
<html>
<object classid='clsid:74FFE28D-2378-11D5-990C-006094235084'
id='notCompromising'></object>
<script language='vbscript'>
overflowBuffer=String(300,"A")
notCompromising.RunEgatherer overflowBuffer </script>
The vulnerable code is as follows:
text:10003B73 push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] ; lpString
text:10003B76 call ds:lstrlenW
text:10003B7C lea edi, [eax+eax+2]
text:10003B80 mov eax, edi
text:10003B82 add eax, 3
text:10003B85 and al, 0FCh
text:10003B87 call __alloca_probe
text:10003B8C mov esi, esp
text:10003B8E push ebx ; lpUsedDefaultChar = 0x0
text:10003B8F push ebx ; lpDefaultChar = 0x0
text:10003B90 push edi ; cchMultiByte = 1002 (eax*2 + 2)
text:10003B91 push esi ; lpMultiByteStr = ESP (STACK)
text:10003B92 push 0FFFFFFFFh ; cchWideChar = -1
text:10003B94 push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch] ; lpWideCharStr = ptr to our
string
text:10003B97 mov [esi], bl
text:10003B99 push ebx ; dwFlags = 0x0
text:10003B9A push ebx ; CodePage = 0x0
text:10003B9B call ds:WideCharToMultiByte
The vulnerability begins with a stack allocation for the string. This is
not in itself vulnerable, but there has yet to be a length check the
supplied string. The string is copied again one more into memory, slightly
below the first, and then lower-cased:
text:10003BA1 lea eax, [ebp-118h]
text:10003BA7 push esi ; unsigned __int8 *
text:10003BA8 mov esi, ds:_mbscpy
text:10003BAE push eax ; unsigned __int8 *
text:10003BAF call esi ; _mbscpy
text:10003BB1 lea eax, [ebp-118h]
text:10003BB7 pop ecx
text:10003BB8 test eax, eax
text:10003BBA pop ecx
text:10003BBB jz short loc_10003C23
text:10003BBD lea eax, [ebp-118h]
text:10003BC3 push eax ; unsigned __int8 *
text:10003BC4 call sub_10003C45 ; TOLOWER SUBROUTINE
The original string remains untouched, and all future operations will be
performed on the lower-case string. However, because there were no length
checks on the string, the memory is copied straight into the undersized
stack buffer and causes a simple buffer overflow.
Vendor Status:
IBM UK has patched the vulnerability in their latest version of the
eGatherer ActiveX control (3.20.0284.0), available here:
<http://www-307.ibm.com/pc/support/IbmEgath.cab>;
http://www-307.ibm.com/pc/support/IbmEgath.cab
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by Andre Derek Protas.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.eeye.com/html/research/advisories/AD20060816.html>;
http://www.eeye.com/html/research/advisories/AD20060816.html
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