Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2001 18:10:55 -0500 (EST)
From: CERT Advisory <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]Subject: CERT Advisory CA-2001-34 Buffer Overflow in System V Derived Login
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
CERT Advisory CA-2001-34 Buffer Overflow in System V Derived Login
Original release date: December 12, 2001
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
* IBM AIX versions 4.3 and 5.1
* Hewlett-Packard's HP-UX
* SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 and earlier
* SGI IRIX 3.x
* Sun Solaris 8 and earlier
Overview
Several applications use login for authentication to the system. A
remotely exploitable buffer overflow exists in login derived from
System V. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to gain root access
to the server.
I. Description
Several implementations of login that are derived from System V allow
a user to specify arguments such as environment variables to the
process. An array of buffers is used to store these arguments. A flaw
exists in the checking of the number of arguments accepted. This flaw
permits the array of buffers to be overflowed.
On most systems, login is not suid; therefore, it runs as the user who
called it. If, however, login is called by an application that runs
with greater privileges than those of the user, such as telnetd or
rlogind, then the user can exploit this vulnerability to gain the
privileges of that program. In the case of telnetd or rlogind, root
access is gained.
Since in.telnetd and in.rlogind are available over the network, a
remote attacker without any previous access to the system could use
this vulnerability to gain root access to the system.
If a program that invokes login is suid (or sgid) USER_A, then this
can be exploited to gain the privileges of USER_A.
An exploit exists and may be circulating.
II. Impact
This vulnerability can be remotely exploited to gain privileges of the
invoker of login. In the case of a program such as telnetd, rlogind,
or other suid root programs, root access is gained.
III. Solution
Apply a patch from your vendor
Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this
section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular
vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments.
Please review the VU#569272 for your vendor's status or contact your
vendor directly.
Restrict access to login
We recommend disabling TELNET, RLOGIN and other programs that use
login for authentication. Do not use programs that use a vulnerable
login for authentication. Note that some SSH applications can be
configured to use login for authentication. If this configuration is
selected, then you will still be vulnerable.
If you cannot disable the service, you can limit your exposure to
these vulnerabilities by using a router or firewall to restrict access
to port 23/TCP (telnet) and port 513/TCP (rlogin). Note that this does
not protect you against attackers from within your network.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.
Apple Computer, Inc.
Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server are not vulnerable.
Caldera
We are not using a SystemV based /bin/login, we are using the BSD
originated rlogin tools. All OpenLinux products are 'Not Vulnerable'.
Compaq Computer Corporation
Compaq's Tru64 Software is not impacted by this reported problem.
Cray Inc.
Cray Inc. has determined that its implementation of login is not
vulnerable to the situation described in VU#569272.
Hewlett-Packard
HP-UX is NOT Exploitable, even though HP-UX does have the buffer
overflow, and hence is listed as "effected" above. In any case, the
buffer overflow has been fixed by HP.
IBM
IBM's AIX operating system, versions 4.3 and 5.1, are susceptible to
this vulnerability. We have prepared an emergency fix ("efix"),
"tsmlogin_efix.tar.Z", and it is available for downloading from:
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security
The APAR assignment for AIX 5.1 is IY26221, and will be available
soon. The APAR for AIX 4.3 is pending, as a new level of 4.3 is nearly
available. The "README" file at the above FTP site will be updated to
provide the official fix information and availability.
NetBSD
NetBSD does not use a System V derived login, and therefore, NetBSD is
not vulnerable.
Red Hat
Red Hat Linux does not use a System V derived /bin/login, and is
therefore not vulnerable to this.
Sun Microsystems
Sun has developed a fix and T-patches are being tested. Official
patches will be released shortly and Sun will issue a Sun Security
Bulletin when they are available.
_________________________________________________________________
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Internet Security Systems and Sun
Microsystems for the technical information they provided.
_________________________________________________________________
Feedback on this document can be directed to the author,
Jason A. Rafail
_________________________________________________________________
References
* http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/569272
* http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-34.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: [email protected]
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
http://www.cert.org/
To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to [email protected]. Please include in the body of your
message
subscribe cert-advisory
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
_________________________________________________________________
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
December 12, 2001 : Initial Release
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 6.5.8
iQCVAwUBPBfg3qCVPMXQI2HJAQE8swP/SGmx37pJWLq9fWhwx/xzu/DSwf8AnjjP
jYbOqE+Iy17YOlI38q1MMh3ifgWoQSW6EeCWlt+Wu6R19APdfbuIbEv+/1iDP+6/
VZK+nnjs4F/i7rWcW0vH8jojFrNkXpAfuZIMEkvzcS/EkrgCisIiB3x9t75CQT+6
V7+HUmMS7+0=
=aq9W
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
