Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 08:00:00 -0800 (UTC)
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@cisco.com.>
To: [email protected]Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454 and Cisco ONS15327 Vulnerabilities
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454 and Cisco ONS15327 Vulnerabilities
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2002 October 31 at 1600 UTC
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco ONS15454 optical transport
platform and the Cisco ONS15327 edge optical transport platform. All Cisco
ONS software releases earlier than 3.4 are vulnerable.
The Cisco ONS15454E is affected only by CSCdx82962.
These vulnerabilities are documented as Cisco bug ID CSCds52295,
CSCdt84146, CSCdv62307, CSCdw15690, CSCdx82962 and CSCdy70756. There are
workarounds available to mitigate the effects of these vulnerabilities.
This advisory will be posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ons-multiple-vuln-pub.shtml.
Affected Products
All Cisco ONS15454 and ONS15327 hardware running Cisco ONS releases
earlier than 3.4 are affected by these vulnerabilities.
Hardware not affected includes the Cisco ONS15540 extended service
platform, ONS15800 series, ONS15200 series metro DWDM systems and the
ONS15194 IP transport concentrator.
The Cisco ONS15454E is affected only by CSCdx82962.
No other Cisco product is currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
To determine your software revision, view the help-about window on the CTC
network management software.
Details
The ONS hardware is managed via the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or the XTC control
cards which are usually connected to a network isolated from the Internet
and local to the customer's environment. This limits the exposure to the
exploitation of the vulnerabilites from the Internet.
These vulnerabilities are documented as Cisco bug ID CSCds52295,
CSCdt84146, CSCdv62307, CSCdw15690, CSCdx82962 and CSCdy70756, which
requires a CCO account to view and can be viewed after 2002 November 1 at
1600 UTC.
CSCds52295
It is possible to open a FTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC
using any nonexistent user-name and password. In order to exploit
this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a FTP
connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdt84146
User-names and passwords are stored in clear text in the running
image database of the TCC, TCC+ or XTC. In order to exploit this
vulnerability a person needs access to the backup of the image
database.
CSCdv62307
The SNMP community string "public" cannot be changed in the Cisco
ONS software. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person must
be able to establish a SNMP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdw15690
Requesting an invalid CORBA Interoperable Object Reference (IOR)
via HTTP may cause the TCC, TCC+ or XTC to reset. In order to
exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a
HTTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdx82962
HTTP requests starting with any character other than '/' may cause
the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or XTC to reset. In order to exploit this
vulnerability a person must be able to establish a HTTP connection
to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdy70756
The TCC, TCC+ and XTC have a user-name and password that can be
used to gain access to the underlying VxWorks Operating System and
it is not possible to change or disable this account. In order to
exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a
Telnet connection to TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
Impact
CSCds52295
Once a FTP connection has been opened a person could upload
modified configuration files and delete software images from the
TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdt84146
By analyzing an offline database backup of the TCC, TCC+ or XTC,
it is possible to extract user-name and password pairs. Using the
administrator password a person can access the TCC, TCC+ or XTC
either remotely or locally and gain complete control over the
Cisco ONS platform.
CSCdv62307
By using the SNMP read-only community string a person may gain
unauthorized access to information in the SNMP MIBs on the TCC,
TCC+ or XTC. User-names and passwords cannot be extracted using
this method.
CSCdw15690
By requesting an invalid CORBA IOR object via HTTP a person may
cause the TCC, TCC+ or XTC to reset. This does not impact the
traffic already flowing through the switch.
CSCdx82962
By requesting URLs starting with a character other than '/' via
HTTP a person may cause the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or XTC to reset. This
does not impact the traffic already flowing through the switch.
CSCdy70756
Using the VxWorks OS account a person can access the TCC, TCC+ or
XTC either remotely or locally and gain complete control over the
Cisco ONS platform.
Software Versions and Fixes
All vulnerabilities are fixed in the Cisco ONS software release 3.4 and
later for the TCC+ installed in the ONS 15454, the TCCi installed in the
ONS 15454E and the XTC installed in the ONS 15327. For the TCC control
cards, the Cisco ONS software release 2.3.3 will be available on CCO on
November 4, 2002.
The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco ONS
15454 is detailed at
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15400/r34dohcs/procedur/r34pctc.htm.
The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco ONS
15327 is detailed at
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15327/r34userd/2734ctc.htm.
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco is offering free software upgrades to address these vulnerabilities
for all affected customers. Customers may only install and expect support
for the feature sets they have purchased.
Customers with service contracts should contact their regular update
channels to obtain the free software upgrade identified via this advisory.
For most customers with service contracts, this means that upgrades should
be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/kobayashi/sw-center/sw-optical.shtml.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through a prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
support organization for assistance with obtaining the free software
upgrade(s).
Customers who purchased directly from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale, should obtain fixed software by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC) using the contact information listed below. In
these cases, customers are entitled to obtain an upgrade to a later
version of the same release or as indicated by the applicable corrected
software version in the Software Versions and Fixes section (noted above).
Cisco TAC contacts are as follows:
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: [email protected]
See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone
numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
advisory as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade.
Please do not contact either "[email protected]" or
"[email protected]" for software upgrades.
Workarounds
CSCds52295
Restrict FTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
configured to restrict FTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that
FTP access is only allowed from authorized workstations. This can
be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast
Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
authorized workstation from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdt84146
It is possible to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by
making sure that the backup Cisco ONS images from the TCC, TCC+ or
XTC are secure from unauthorized access.
CSCdv62307
Restrict SNMP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
configured to restrict SNMP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that
SNMP access is only allowed from valid network management
workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and
turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdw15690
Restrict HTTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
configured to restrict HTTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that
HTTP access is only allowed from valid network management
workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and
turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdx82962
Restrict HTTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
configured to restrict HTTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that
HTTP access is only allowed from valid network management
workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and
turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
CSCdy70756
Restrict Telnet traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
configured to restrict Telnet access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so
that Telnet access is only allowed from authorized workstations.
This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on
Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
workstation from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
All defects were reported to Cisco by customers. The Cisco PSIRT is not
aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities
described in this advisory.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
This is a final advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to the
best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of
this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should
there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this
advisory.
A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
errors.
Distribution
This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ons-multiple-vuln-pub.shtml.
In addition to worldwide website posting, a text version of this advisory
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key having the fingerprint FEB1
1B89 A64B 60BB 4770 D1CE 93D2 FF06 F236 759C and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients:
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* [email protected] (includes CERT/CC)
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* Various internal Cisco mailing lists
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to
check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 31-October-2003 | Initial public release. |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. This includes instructions for
press inquiries regarding Cisco security advisories.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This notice is Copyright 2002 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and
include all date and version information.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 6.5.8
Comment: Signed by Sharad Ahlawat, Cisco Systems PSIRT
iQA/AwUBPcFZkJPS/wbyNnWcEQKMDQCfaEQb5+UsRXdzSkMLzhYU/PQ4L+4An3c9
P8e1wRxQtFxIYosqKexP4vKZ
=0heF
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: PGP 6.5.8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=UuaC
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
