Date: 18 Apr 2004 16:26:11 +0200
From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]Subject: [NEWS] Cisco IPsec VPN Implementation Group Password Usage Vulnerability
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Cisco IPsec VPN Implementation Group Password Usage Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
This Security Notice is being released due to the new information received
by Cisco PSIRT regarding the Cisco IPSec VPN implementation, Group
Password Usage Vulnerability.
DETAILS
Details:
Proof of Concept code now exists for:
* Recovering the Group Password - The Group Password used by the Cisco
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) virtual private network (VPN) client is
scrambled on the hard drive, but unscrambled in memory. This password can
now be recovered on both the Linux and Microsoft Windows platform
implementations of the Cisco IPSec VPN client. This vulnerability is
documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID CSCed41329.
* The Linux implementation vulnerability was reported by Karl
Gaissmaier, University of Ulm, Germany.
* The Microsoft Windows implementation vulnerability was reported by
Jonas Eriksson and Nicholas Kathmann.
* Man In The Middle (MITM) attack to emulate a VPN head end server for
stealing valid user names and passwords or hijacking connections using a
previously recovered Group Password - This vulnerability exists whenever
Group Passwords are used as the pre-shared key during Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) Phase 1 in the XAUTH protocol. The user name and password
in XAUTH are transmitted over the network only encrypted by the Phase 1
IKE security association (SA) which in this case are derived from the
Group Password. Anyone in possession of the Group Passwords will have the
ability to either hijack a connection from a valid user, or pose as a VPN
head end for stealing user names and passwords.
In the e-mail thread on Bugtraq, it was mentioned that Cisco might be
looking at implementing Challenge/Response Authentication of Cryptographic
Keys (CRACK) as an alternate to XAUTH. This information was incorrect and
Cisco does not plan to implement the CRACK authentication method.
Cisco is working on implementing IKEv2 with an estimated release date in
the fourth quarter of the calendar year 2005.
For the Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator, Cisco VPN Client (software client)
and Cisco VPN 3002 Hardware Client, Cisco is in the process of
implementing a feature that is based on the expired IETF draft `A Hybrid
Authentication Mode for IKE' published in August of 2000.
Cisco's solution extends the Hybrid Auth model by additionally requiring a
group pre-shared key for VPN group identification. The group pre-shared
key will be used solely to associate users with their appropriate VPN
groups, followed by the XAUTH exchange that will then authenticate the
user.
The MITM attack vulnerability described in this document will no longer be
possible because of the additional digital signature that will bind the
keying material to the Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator's digital certificate.
This feature is estimated to ship in the third quarter of the calendar
year 2004.
Hybrid Authentication mode is a two stage process that allows the
asymmetric use of digital certificates between the client and the head end
server. The first stage is used to authenticate the head end server by the
client and is based on the IKE Phase 1 exchange where in the client
verifies the authenticity of the head end server's certificate. The second
stage authenticates the client by the head end server and is based on a
Transaction Exchange (IKECFG) using the mechanism described in the XAUTH
protocol. Pre-shared keys are not used.
Workarounds:
No workarounds exist for the vulnerabilities documented in this Notice.
To avoid the potential exploitation because of these vulnerabilities Cisco
PSIRT recommends customer deploy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and
carefully evaluate the risks of deploying Group Password based
authentication schemes.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Related Information:
SAFE VPN IPsec Virtual Private Networks in Depth -
<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns171/ns128/networking_solutions_white_paper09186a00801dca2d.shtml>; http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns171/ns128/networking_solutions_white_paper09186a00801dca2d.shtml - refer to the Identity and IPSec Access Control under Architecture Overview section.
Deploying Cisco IOS Security with a Public-Key Infrastructure -
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/iosw/prodlit/pkdpy_wp.htm>;
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/iosw/prodlit/pkdpy_wp.htm
A Hybrid Authentication Mode for IKE -
<http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/00dec/I-D/draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-05.txt>; http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/00dec/I-D/draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-05.txt
Cisco Response to Internet Key Exchange Issue -
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sn-20030422-ike.html>;
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sn-20030422-ike.html
The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com.> Cisco
Systems Product Security Incident Response Team.
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