Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 17:30:00 -0500
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@cisco.com.>
To: [email protected]Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Vulnerabilities in SNMP Message Processing
Cc: [email protected]
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Cisco Security Advisory: Vulnerabilities in SNMP Message Processing
Revision 1.0 INTERIM
For Public Release 2004 April 20 UTC 2100
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice: INTERIM
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) Software releases trains
12.0S, 12.1E, 12.2, 12.2S, 12.3, 12.3B and 12.3T may contain a
vulnerability in processing SNMP requests which, if exploited, could
cause the device to reload.
The vulnerability is only present in certain IOS releases on Cisco
routers and switches. This behavior was introduced via a code change
and is resolved with CSCed68575.
This vulnerability can be remotely triggered. A successful exploitation
of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the device and could be
exploited repeatedly to produce a Denial of Service (DoS).
This advisory is available at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040420-snmp.shtml
Affected Products
=================
This vulnerability was introduced by a code change for CSCeb22276. This
change was committed to the following releases, causing these releases
to be vulnerable.
Note: The list below is not comprehensive; it is provided to help
quickly identify some commonly used releases. Please see the Software
Versions and Fixes section of this advisory for the complete IOS
upgrade table.
* 12.0(23)S4, 12.0(23)S5
* 12.0(24)S4, 12.0(24)S5
* 12.0(26)S1
* 12.0(27)S
* 12.0(27)SV, 12.0(27)SV1
* 12.1(20)E, 12.1(20)E1, 12.1(20)E2
* 12.1(20)EA1
* 12.1(20)EW, 12.1(20)EW1
* 12.1(20)EC, 12.1(20)EC1
* 12.2(12g), 12.2(12h)
* 12.2(20)S, 12.2(20)S1
* 12.2(21), 12.2(21a)
* 12.2(23)
* 12.3(2)XC1, 12.3(2)XC2
* 12.3(5), 12.3(5a), 12.3(5b)
* 12.3(6)
* 12.3(4)T, 12.3(4)T1, 12.3(4)T2, 12.3(4)T3
* 12.3(5a)B
* 12.3(4)XD, 12.3(4)XD1
To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the
device and issue the show version command to display the system banner.
Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating
System Software" or simply "IOS". On the next line of output, the
image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version"
and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show
version command or will give different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release
12.0(3) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (TM)
2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE
The release train label is "12.0".
The next example shows a product running IOS release 12.0(2a)T1 with an
image name of C2600-JS-MZ:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm)
C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.0(2a)T1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
Details
=======
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) defines a standard
mechanism for remote management and monitoring of devices in an
Internet Protocol (IP) network. A device or host that supports SNMP is
an SNMP entity. There are two classes of SNMP entities: SNMP managers
that request information and receive unsolicited messages and SNMP
agents that respond to requests and send unsolicited messages. SNMP
entities that support SNMP proxy functions combine the functions of
both SNMP manager and SNMP agent.
There are two classes of SNMP operations: solicited operations such as
'get' or 'set', with which the SNMP manager requests or changes the
value of a managed object on an SNMP agent; and unsolicited operations
such as 'trap' or 'inform' messages with which the SNMP agent provides
an unsolicited notification or alarm message to the SNMP manager. The
'inform' operation is essentially an acknowledged 'trap'.
All SNMP operations are transported over the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP). Solicited operations are sent by the SNMP manager to the UDP
destination port 161 on the agent. Unsolicited operations are sent by
the SNMP agent to the UDP destination port 162. In IOS, The
acknowledgement sent by the SNMP manager to an SNMP agent in reply to
an 'inform' operation is sent to a randomly chosen high port that is
chosen when the SNMP process is started.
As IOS implements both an SNMP agent and SNMP proxy functionality, the
SNMP process in IOS starts listening for SNMP operations on UDP ports
161, 162 and the random UDP port at the time it is initialized. The
SNMP process is started either at the time the device boots, or when
SNMP is configured.
The high port is chosen via the following series of steps:
1. A random number between 49152 and 59152 is generated.
2. IOS checks to see if that UDP port is already being used. If not,
that UDP port is selected to receive SNMP 'inform' acknowledge
messages.
3. If the port is already in use, IOS increments the port number by 1,
and checks again, incrementing until an open port is found.
Therefore, the port chosen may be higher than 59152 although this is
considered unlikely.
In this vulnerability, the IOS SNMP process is incorrectly attempting
to process SNMP solicited operations on UDP port 162 and the random UDP
port. Upon attempting to process a solicited SNMP operation on one of
those ports, the device can experience memory corruption and may
reload.
SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c solicited operations to the vulnerable ports will
perform an authentication check against the SNMP community string,
which may be used to mitigate attacks. Through best practices of hard
to guess community strings and community string ACLs, this
vulnerability may be mitigated for both SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c. However,
any SNMPv3 solicited operation to the vulnerable ports will reset the
device. If configured for SNMP, all affected versions will process SNMP
version 1, 2c and 3 operations.
This vulnerability was introduced by DDTS CSCeb22276 and has been
corrected with DDTS CSCed68575.
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in a reload of
the device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS
attack.
Software Versions and Fixes
Be advised that Cisco released multiple advisories on 2004-April-20.
When considering software upgrades, please also consult
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/advisory.html and any subsequent
advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release
train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest
possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and
the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the
"Rebuild," "Interim," and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a
release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a
specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be
vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated
release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed
Release label). When selecting a release, keep in mind the following
definitions:
* Maintenance - Most heavily tested, stable, and highly recommended
release of a release train in any given row of the table.
* Rebuild - Constructed from the previous maintenance or major
release in the same train, it contains the fix for a specific
defect. Although it receives less testing, it contains only the
minimal changes necessary to repair the vulnerability.
* Interim - Built at regular intervals between maintenance releases
and receives less testing. Interims should be selected only if
there is no other suitable release that addresses the
vulnerability. Interim images should be upgraded to the next
available maintenance release as soon as possible. Interim releases
are not available through manufacturing, and usually they are not
available for customer download from CCO without prior arrangement
with the Cisco TAC.
To find the information for a given IOS release, compare the release
number as reported by the show version command to the major releases in
the first column below. For example, if your device reports that it is
running 12.3(5), find the row in the table for "12.3". Reading across
to the right, you find 12.3(5c) in the Rebuild column, indicating that
12.3(5) through 12.3(5b) are vulnerable. Since 12.3(5c) is already
available for download from CCO, you could upgrade to it as soon as
possible.
If a release train is labeled "Vulnerable", then migration to another
release train should be considered. Except where a release label in a
different release train is explicitly identified in the table below,
customers should contact the Cisco TAC for assistance to identify the
appropriate migration path. If migration is not possible, then
workarounds may be the only alternative.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to confirm that the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new software release. If the information is not clear,
contact the Cisco TAC for assistance as shown in the "Obtaining Fixed
Software" section below.
More information on Cisco IOS software release names and abbreviations
is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. The fixes
will be available at the Software Center located at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Major Release | Availability of Repaired Releases |
|-------------------+-----------------------------------------------|
| Affected 12.0 | Rebuild | Interim | Maintenance |
| -Based Release | | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.0(23)S6 | | |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.0(24)S6 - | | |
| | Due on CCO | | |
| 12.0S | mid-May, | | |
| | 2004. | | |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.0(26)S2 | | |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.0(27)S1 | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.0(27)SV2 - | | |
| 12.0SV | contact TAC. | | |
| | Available | | |
| | upon request. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| Affected 12.1 | Rebuild | Interim | Maintenance |
| -Based Release | | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.1(20)E3 - | | |
| | Due on CCO | | |
| | April 20, | | |
| | 2004. | | |
| 12.1E |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.1(22)E1 - | | |
| | Due on CCO | | |
| | April 20, | | |
| | 2004. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.1(20)EA1a | | |
| 12.1EA | - Due on CCO | | |
| | April 21, | | |
| | 2004. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.1(20)EC2 - | | |
| 12.1EC | contact TAC. | | |
| | Available | | |
| | upon request. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.1(20)EW2 - | | |
| 12.1EW | Due on CCO | | |
| | April 21, | | |
| | 2004. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| Affected 12.2 | Rebuild | Interim | Maintenance |
| -Based Release | | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.2(12i) | | |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.2(21b) | | |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 12.2 | | 12.2(23.6) - | 12.2(24) - |
| | | available | Due on CCO |
| | | upon request. | mid-May, |
| | | | 2004. |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.2(23a) | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.2(20)S2 | | |
| 12.2S |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.2(22)S | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| Affected 12.3 | Rebuild | Interim | Maintenance |
| -Based Release | | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.3(5c) | | |
| |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.3(6a) | | |
| 12.3 |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | | 12.3(7.7) - | 12.3(9) - Due |
| | | available | on CCO |
| | | upon request. | mid-May, |
| | | | 2004. |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.3(5)B1 - | | |
| 12.3B | Due on CCO | | |
| | mid-June | | |
| | 2004. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.3(4)T4 | | |
| 12.3T |---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.3(7)T | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| | 12.3(2)XC3 - | | |
| 12.3XC | contact TAC | | |
| | Available | | |
| | upon request. | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 12.3XD | 12.3(4)XD2 | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 12.3XH | 12.3(4)XH | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 12.3XK | 12.3(4)XK | | |
|-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------|
| 12.3XQ | 12.3(4)XQ | | |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Obtaining Fixed Software
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com/.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade,
which is free of charge.
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their free of charge upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: [email protected]
Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of
this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Please do not contact either "[email protected]" or
"[email protected]" for software upgrades.
Workarounds
===========
The effectiveness of any workarounds is dependent on specific customer
situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior and
organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and
releases, customers should consult with their service provider or
support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most
appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
The following workarounds should only be considered as a long term
solution if anti-spoofing methods consistently prevent spoofed source
attacks from entering the network and access-lists provided below are
configured on every potentially affected device.
* It is possible to disable SNMP processing on the device running IOS
by issuing the following command:
no snmp-server
Removing the public community string with the configure command
'no snmp-server community <string> ro' is not sufficient as the
SNMP server will still be running and the device will be
vulnerable. The command no snmp-server must be used
instead. Verify SNMP server status by using the enable command
show snmp. You should see a response of "%SNMP agent not enabled".
* Access Control Lists (ACLs) can be used to deny traffic tot he
affected ports. As there can be no guarantee that the random high
port will fall in the range of 49152 to 59152 (possibly as high as
65535), the example access-lists below show how to block all UDP
ports in the range 49152 to 65535. Care should be taken to
understand the potential side effects noted later in this section.
Although Cisco IOS devices have community-string access lists which
check the source address of SNMP requests per community string,
they will not be sufficient to mitigate this vulnerability due to
the SNMPv3 exploitation vector.
On platforms that do not have the option to use rACLs, it is
possible to permit UDP traffic to the router from trusted IP
addresses with interface ACLs.
Note: Because SNMP is based on UDP, it is possible to spoof the
sender's IP address, which may defeat ACLs that permit
communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses.
The following extended access-list can be adapted to your network.
This example assumes that the router has IP addresses 192.168.10.1
and 172.16.1.1 configured on its interfaces, that all SNMP access
is to be restricted to a management station with the IP address of
10.1.1.1, and that the management station need only communicate
with IP address 192.168.10.1:
access-list 101 permit udp host 10.1.1.1 host 192.168.10.1 range 161 162
access-list 101 permit udp host 10.1.1.1 host 192.168.10.1 range 49152 65535
access-list 101 deny udp any host 192.168.10.1 range 161 162
access-list 101 deny udp any host 192.168.10.1 range 49152 65535
access-list 101 deny udp any host 172.16.1.1 range 161 162
access-list 101 deny udp any host 172.16.1.1 range 49152 65535
access-list 101 permit ip any any
The access-list must then be applied to all interfaces using the
following configuration commands:
interface ethernet 0/0
ip access-group 101 in
Note that UDP traffic in the ranges specified above must be
explicitly blocked to each IP address on the router to prevent the
router from accepting and processing the SNMP packets.
Additionally, while blocking traffic to port 161 from unknown hosts
is a best practice, in this case, port 161 is not affected and need
not be blocked to prevent exploitation.
All devices that communicate directly with the router on those UDP
ports will need to be specifically listed in the above access list.
Cisco IOS uses ports in the range 49152 to 65535 as the source port
for outbound sessions such as DNS queries.
For devices that have many IP addresses configured, or many hosts
that need to communicate with the router, this may not be a
scalable solution.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Cisco IOS uses the same source port range when
upgrading via TFTP. If your upgrade process includes downloading
from a TFTP server, be sure to permit UDP traffic in the range
49152 to 65535 between the router and the TFTP server. Alternative
download methods that do not rely on UDP, such as FTP, may also be
used.
Besides TFTP, other potentially affected services include Network
Time Protocol (NTP), Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS) and Domain Name Service (DNS). To minimize the impact of
this workaround, you may want to explicitly permit access between
your IOS device and the servers providing the service(s). It is
critically important that you understand the impact to your network
before deploying the above workaround.
* Blocking Individual Ports
The high port number chosen by the IOS device can be determined by
using the command show ip sockets. UDP traffic to that individual
port can be blocked, rather than the entire port range. This
approach is not ideal because the high port is chosen at random
when the router is rebooted or the SNMP service is stopped and
restarted. This may, however, be a short term solution for
customers that want to protect themselves from the vulnerability as
they prepare to upgrade, for example.
Output of the show ip sockets command:
Router#sh ip sockets
Proto Remote Port Local Port In Out Stat TTY OutputIF
[snip]
17 --listen-- 192.168.10.72 161 0 0 1 0
17 --listen-- 192.168.10.72 162 0 0 11 0
17 --listen-- 192.168.10.72 49212 0 0 11 0
The above example shows that there are 3 SNMP-related ports
listening, and the high port is bound to 49212.
Rather than blocking the entire port range from 49152 to 65535,
port 49212 can be blocked (in addition to port 162) as a temporary
workaround.
* Receive ACLs (rACL)
For distributed platforms, rACLs may be an option starting in Cisco
IOS Software Versions 12.0(21)S2 for the 12000 series GSR and 12.0
(24)S for the 7500 series. The receive access lists protect the
device from harmful traffic before the traffic can impact the route
processor. Receive path ACLs are considered a network security best
practice, and should be considered as a long-term addition to good
network security, as well as a workaround for this specific
vulnerability. The CPU load is distributed to the line card
processors and helps mitigate load on the main route processor. The
white paper entitled "GSR: Receive Access Control Lists" will help
identify and allow legitimate traffic to your device and deny all
unwanted packets:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/racl.html
* Infrastructure ACLs (iACL)
Although it is often difficult to block traffic transiting your
network, it is possible to identify traffic which should never be
allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that
traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are
considered a network security best practice and should be
considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well
as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper
entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access
Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment
techniques for iACLs:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of This Notice: INTERIM
This is a INTERIM advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the
accuracy of all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been
checked to the best of our ability. Cisco may issue updated versions of
this advisory
A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040420-snmp.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* [email protected] (includes CERT/CC)
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* [email protected]
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* Various other mailing lists
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2004-April-20 | Public |
| | | Release. |
+----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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