Date: 16 Dec 2004 12:25:12 +0200
From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]Subject: [NEWS] Default Administrative Password in Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector
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Default Administrative Password in Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly
Detector
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector software contains a
default password for an administrative account. This password is set,
without any user's intervention, during installation of the software used
by the Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) mitigation appliances, and is the same in all installations
of the product.
Software version 3.0 and earlier of the Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly
Detector are affected by this vulnerability. Customers running version 3.1
or higher of the software are not affected. There are workarounds
available including one that does not require a reboot of the device.
Cisco has made free software available to address this problem.
DETAILS
Affected Products
Vulnerable Products
All versions of the software for the Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly
Detector prior to version 3.1 are affected by this vulnerability.
There are three ways to determine the software version that your Cisco
Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector DDoS mitigation appliances are
running:
* Virtual terminal or local serial console connection
* Remote Secure Shell (SSH) connection
* Remote secure web session
What follows is an example of each method; you should choose the method
that applies to your particular environment and network setup.
1. To determine the software version number through the local serial
console use a serial cable and a terminal emulation program to connect to
the appliance. Once you are connected press the Enter key of your terminal
and the Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector will present, without even
logging in, the version of the software running on the devices:
Cisco Guard Version 3.1(0.12)
GUARD login:
In this example the Cisco Guard is running software version 3.1.
For a virtual terminal the procedure is the same except that no serial
cable or terminal emulation program is needed (a standard keyboard and
monitor are directly connected to the appliance.)
2. To obtain the software version number through a SSH session use a SSH
client to log into the Cisco Guard or Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector and
issue the show version command-line interface (CLI) command. The following
example shows an interaction with a Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector:
prompt$ ssh [email protected][email protected]'s password:
Last login: Wed Nov 24 22:45:53 on ttyS0
admin@DETECTOR#show version
Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Software License Agreement
[...]
Cisco Anomaly Detector
Release: 3.1(0.12)
Date: 2004/10/27 19:58:14
DETECTOR uptime is 3 weeks, 3 days, 17 hours, 53 minutes
System Serial Number: XXXXXXX
Contact Information:
Cisco Systems Inc.
[email protected]
admin@DETECTOR#
In this example the Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector is running software
version 3.1.
3. To obtain the software version that Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic
Anomaly Detector are running through a secure web interface, open the URL
https://<IP address of your Guard or Detector>/ in a web browser, log in,
and then click on the About link located on the top right section of the
browser window.
Details
The Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detectors are Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation appliances that detect the presence of
a potential DDoS attack and divert attack traffic destined for the network
being monitored without affecting the flow of legitimate traffic.
Both the Cisco Guard and the Cisco Anomaly Traffic Detector appliances can
be managed via a virtual terminal (standard keyboard and monitor attached
directly to the appliance), a local serial console, remote SSH
connections, and/or remote secure web sessions. Most management and
troubleshooting tasks are performed through a CLI interface that is
similar to that of most Cisco products, but a special administrative
account is provided so certain management and troubleshooting tasks that
are not covered by the standard CLI can be performed. The administrative
account username is root, like the superuser in the Unix operating system.
This account has a default password that is the same in all installations
of the Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector in all versions
prior to 3.1. This default password is made up of a combination of
letters, numbers, and punctuation per best security practices for
passwords, but Cisco recommends that this password be changed for extra
security.
The vulnerability described here is documented in the Cisco Bug ID
CSCeg12167 (registered customers only) for the Cisco Guard and in the
Cisco Bug ID CSCeg12188 (registered customers only) for the Cisco Traffic
Anomaly Detector.
Impact
Someone that is able to log into a Cisco Guard or Cisco Traffic Anomaly
Detector DDoS mitigation appliance using the root administrative account
has full control of the device, which includes the ability to change
configurations, divert traffic, and install software.
Software Versions and Fixes
While workarounds that do not require a software upgrade exist, Cisco has
made available free software that addresses the vulnerability described in
this document.
Version 3.1 or later of the Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector
software does not leave a default password for the administrative root
account after a fresh installation or after an upgrade from previous
versions. This is because in version 3.1 and later the
installation/upgrade procedure requires the user to choose a password for
the administrative account.
Note: the procedure to upgrade to version 3.1 can only be done through the
out-of-band interfaces.
When considering software upgrades, please also consult
<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.html>; http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.html and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices
to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and
software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new
release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center ("TAC") for assistance.
If affected customers are not able to upgrade the software, the
workarounds presented in the Workarounds section can be employed to
completely eliminate this vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
As the fix for this vulnerability is a default configuration change, and a
workaround is available, a software upgrade is not required to address
this vulnerability. However, if you have a service contract, and wish to
upgrade to unaffected code, you may obtain upgraded software through your
regular update channels once that software is available. For most
customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the
Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at <http://www.cisco.com>;
http://www.cisco.com.
If you need assistance with the implementation of the workarounds, or have
questions on the workarounds, please contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC).
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: [email protected]
See <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml>;
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional
TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and
instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using
such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of
Cisco's software license terms found at
<http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html>;
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set
forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
<http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml>;
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Workarounds
The vulnerability described in this document can be eliminated completely
by logging into the affected Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly
Detector DDoS mitigation appliances and changing the default password for
the administrative root account to a strong password chosen by the user.
To change the default password you need to run the passwd command once you
have logged in as the root user. The following interaction shows and
example of a change password dialog in a Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector
that is performed via SSH:
prompt$ ssh [email protected][email protected]'s password:
Last login: Tue Nov 23 15:48:13 on ttyS0
[root@DETECTOR root]# passwd
Changing password for user root.
New password: <new password typed in here>
Retype new password: <new password typed in here>
passwd: all authentication tokens updated successfully.
In order to perform this procedure you will need the default password. To
obtain this password customers must contact the Cisco TAC. Entitlement
will be checked so please have your product serial number available and
give the URL of this notice.
After changing the default password, the Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly
Detector will not accept root logins using the default password.
A reboot is not required for the new password to take effect, so network
operations will not be disrupted.
If affected customers do not wish to contact Cisco to obtain the default
password, it is possible to change the administrative account's password
by performing the password recovery procedure. This procedure is
documented at the following location:
<http://cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5887/products_password_recovery09186a008037942b.shtml>; http://cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5887/products_password_recovery09186a008037942b.shtml
As a security best practice, it is recommended that customers make use of
the access control feature that restricts connectivity to the SSH and
web-based management services to certain IP networks configured by the
administrator. Refer to the documentation for your Cisco Guard and Cisco
Traffic Anomaly Detector, specifically the permit wbm and permit ssh
commands, for details on how to enable this feature. Having these access
control mechanisms in place may mitigate the vulnerability if it cannot be
eliminated completely by changing the default password as described above.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com.> Cisco
Systems Product Security Incident Response Team.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041215-guard.shtml>;
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041215-guard.shtml
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