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[NEWS] Cisco IPSec IKE Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities


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From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 15 Nov 2005 12:46:48 +0200
Subject: [NEWS] Cisco IPSec IKE Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities
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The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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  Cisco IPSec IKE Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

IP Security, or IPSec, is a set of protocols standardized by the IETF to 
support encrypted and/or authenticated transmission of IP packets. IPSec 
is a protocol commonly used in Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate keying material 
for IPSec Security Associations (SAs) and provides authentication of 
peers.

Multiple Cisco products contain vulnerabilities in the processing of IPSec 
IKE (Internet Key Exchange) messages. The vulnerabilities can be exploited 
to produce a denial of service.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Cisco IOS versions based on 12.2SXD, 12.3T, 12.4 and 12.4T
 * Cisco PIX Firewall versions up to but not including 6.3(5)
 * Cisco PIX Firewall/ASA versions up to but not including 7.0.1.4
 * Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) versions up to but not including 
2.3(3)
 * Cisco VPN 3000 Series Concentrators versions up to but not including 
4.1(7)H and 4.7(2)B
 * Cisco MDS Series SanOS versions up to but not including 2.1(2)

The first case is LAN-to-LAN VPN operation in which two devices negotiate 
an IPSec connection between them for the purposes of connecting two remote 
LANs via an IPSec tunnel. In this case the devices negotiating the IPSec 
connection generally have static IP addresses, and the IPSec tunnel is up 
as long as there is traffic that needs to traverse the tunnel.

Successful exploitation of the vulnerability on the Cisco MDS Series may 
result in the restart of the IKE process. All other Cisco MDS device 
operations will continue normally.

The second case is a Remote Access (RA) VPN which is typically used to 
allow remote clients a connection to a secure network or service. A common 
example of this is a user connecting to a corporate network while away 
from the office. In this scenario, the remote user could be connecting 
from anywhere, and their IP address is not static, but rather dynamically 
assigned via the transport provider.

Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities on all other Cisco devices 
may result in the restart of the device. The device will return to normal 
operation without any intervention required.

IKE is not a requirement for the establishment of IPSec connections. 
Depending on your requirements and the devices involved, it may be 
possible to statically configure the SA information and disable IKE. This 
type of configuration may not be possible in the case of RA VPNs due to 
the user's IP address being unknown prior to the establishment of the 
IPSec connection.

Only Cisco IOS images that contain the Crypto Feature Set contain the 
vulnerable IPSec code.

When receiving certain malformed packets, vulnerable Cisco devices may 
reset, causing a temporary Denial of Service (DoS).

Workaround:
The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer 
situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and 
organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and 
releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support 
organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for 
use in the intended network before it is deployed.
For customers that use IPSec, but do not require IKE for connection 
establishment, IPSec connection information may be able to be entered 
manually, and IKE can be disabled, eliminating the exposure.

Note: Due to the potential complexity of configuring IPSec information, 
this is likely not a viable alternative for most customers, but is 
mentioned here for completeness. Please consult your product documentation 
for further information on static IPSec configuration.

Restricting IKE Messages:
It is possible to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by 
restricting the devices that can send IKE traffic to your IPSec devices. 
Due to the potential for IKE traffic to come from a spoofed source 
address, a combination of Access Control Lists (ACLs) and anti-spoofing 
mechanisms will be most effective.


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:psirt@cisco.com.> Cisco 
Systems Product Security Incident Response Team.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20051114-ipsec.shtml>; 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20051114-ipsec.shtml




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DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.

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