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[NT] Limitations in Cisco Secure Desktop


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From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 10 Oct 2006 09:56:06 +0200
Subject: [NT] Limitations in Cisco Secure Desktop
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  Limitations in Cisco Secure Desktop
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

Cisco has been made aware of limitations in the Cisco Secure Desktop (CSD) 
product which may cause information accessed or produced during an SSL VPN 
session to be left outside of the Secure Desktop environment.

There are no identified fixes, but there are some workarounds that can 
help mitigate some of these limitations.

DETAILS

Affected Products:
The limitations described in this advisory exist in all versions of the 
Cisco Secure Desktop product.

Details:
The Cisco Secure Desktop (CSD) seeks to minimize data from being left 
behind after an SSL VPN session terminates. In particular, CSD works to 
reduce, via encryption, the risk that cookies, browser history, temporary 
files, and downloaded content remain on a system after a remote user logs 
out or an SSL VPN session times out.

Cisco has been made aware of the following limitations in CSD that may 
cause data accessed or produced during an SSL VPN session to be left 
outside of the Secure Desktop environment:

Information Leakage via Windows Paging File:
This limitation is the inability to prevent data from leaking to the 
Windows virtual memory file, which is commonly referred to as the paging 
file and is called pagefile.sys. This file is normally located in the root 
directory of the hard drive where Windows is installed, but it can also be 
a group of files stored in various locations, across hard disks and 
partitions.

The paging file is used to store the contents of physical memory that have 
been swapped out by the Windows kernel when there is pressure to provide 
additional physical memory for some application, and no physical memory is 
available. In this case, the Windows kernel swaps out memory used by idle 
processes to the paging file and gives the de-allocated memory to the 
application that is asking for more memory.

As a consequence of how the Windows virtual memory subsystem operates, the 
physical memory contents used by any application, including those running 
in a Secure Desktop, may end up in the paging file. The Windows paging 
file stores "paged out" physical memory contents without encryption, and 
therefore information "paged out" by the operating system may be recovered 
using data forensic tools. Because of this process, CSD may not be able to 
remove from the system all data produced and accessed during the SSL VPN 
session after the VPN session terminates.

This item is not a CSD product defect. It is, rather, a CSD product 
limitation resulting from how the Microsoft Windows operating system 
interacts with applications.

Some possible workarounds may be an option when users have administrative 
rights to their systems, as discussed in the Workarounds section.

Document Recovery via Windows Printer Spool Files:
This limitation consists of an inability of CSD to prevent the recovery of 
files used during an SSL VPN session. If the files have been printed, then 
they can be recovered via the printer spool files, which are usually 
stored in the directory C:\WINDOWS\system32\spool\PRINTERS\ and have .SPL 
extensions. These files are short-lived because they are deleted after 
they have been successfully sent to the printer. However, if there are 
printing problems, or if data forensic methods are applied to the hard 
drive, they can be recovered.

For additional security, CSD provides an administrator-configurable option 
that works to prevent printing from within a CSD session. This option is 
disabled by default.

Inability to Detect Hardware Keystroke Loggers:
This limitation consists of an inability to detect hardware keyloggers 
which may be installed on the system on which CSD is running. This 
limitation stems from the inability of an operating system to detect the 
presence of devices that do not identify themselves, or that deliberately 
misrepresent their device class.

Impact:
The impact of the CSD limitations described in this advisory is that 
information may be left behind on a computer after an SSL VPN session 
terminates and after CSD has attempted to clean up all traces of the data 
accessed or produced during the SSL VPN session.

Workarounds:
Information Leakage via Windows Paging File
The "Information Leakage via Windows Paging File" limitation can be 
mitigated by configuring Windows to clear the paging file at shutdown. 
Instructions on how to configure this are available at:

 <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314834/EN-US/>; 
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314834/EN-US/ (Windows XP)

 <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/182086/EN-US/>; 
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/182086/EN-US/ (Windows 2000)

Please note that this is an option only when administrative access to the 
Windows system is available.

Document Recovery via Windows Printer Spool Files
For the "Document Recovery via Windows Printer Spool Files" limitation, 
configuring CSD to prevent users from printing from within the Secure 
Desktop will help mitigate the limitation. For information on how to do 
this please refer to the Cisco Secure Desktop Configuration Guide, 
available at:

 
<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6742/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00805f9f42.html#wp1041681> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6742/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00805f9f42.html#wp1041681

Inability to Detect Hardware Keystroke Loggers
There are no workarounds for the inability to detect hardware keyloggers.


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:psirt@cisco.com.> Cisco 
Systems Product Security Incident Response Team.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20061009-csd.shtml>; 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20061009-csd.shtml




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