From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 12 Nov 2006 19:38:07 +0200
Subject: [NT] OpenView Client Configuration Manager Device Code Execution
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OpenView Client Configuration Manager Device Code Execution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable device installations of HP OpenView Client Configuraton Manager
(CCM). Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The
CCM server is not affected.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* OpenView Client Configuration Manager version 1.0
The specific flaw exists within the Radia Notify Daemon, radexecd.exe,
which binds to TCP port 3465 on default CCM device installs. The
vulnerable daemon expects to receive data in the following format:
port\x00username\x00password\x00command
Where 'port' specifies a connect back port on the connecting client. Due
to a design flaw a correct username and password is not required in order
to execute arbitrary commands within the radexecd.exe install directory.
This exposes at least two pre-authentication issues. The first, allows
attackers to reboot affected devices by launching radbootw.exe, which
reboots the system without any further prompts. The second, allows
attackers to generate an arbitrary file by launching radcrecv.exe.
radcrecv will listen to an arbitrary port as specified on the command line
and receive files via multicast download. The filename and contents can be
specified by the attacker and is saved to the same directory as
radexecd.exe. Once a malicious file has been generated, it can then be
launched as before.
Vendor Response:
Hewlett-Packard has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:
<http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bizsupport/TechSupport/Document.jsp?objectID=c00795552>; http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bizsupport/TechSupport/Document.jsp?objectID=c00795552
Disclosure Timeline:
2006.10.10 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2006.11.08 - Coordinated public release of advisory
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:TSRT@3com.com.> Pedram Amini,
TippingPoint Security Research Team.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-12.html>;
http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-12.html
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