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[UNIX] Buffer Overflow in ISO9660 File System Component of Linux Kernel


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Date: 15 Apr 2004 19:30:27 +0200
From: SecuriTeam <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [UNIX] Buffer Overflow in ISO9660 File System Component of Linux Kernel

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  Buffer Overflow in ISO9660 File System Component of Linux Kernel
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

Linux is a free Unix-type operating system originally created by Linus 
Torvalds with the assistance of developers around the world. The 'isofs' 
component of the Linux kernel mediates file system interactions with 
ISO-9660 format CD-ROMs. The Linux kernel performs no length checking on 
symbolic links stored on an ISO9660 file system, allowing a malformed CD 
to perform an arbitrary length overflow in kernel memory.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Linux kernel versions 2.4.x, 2.5.x and 2.6.x. Other kernel 
implementations may also be vulnerable.

CVE Information:
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0109>; 
CAN-2004-0109

Symbolic links on ISO9660 file systems are supported by the 'Rock Ridge' 
extension to the standard format. The vulnerability can be triggered by 
performing a directory listing on a maliciously constructed ISO file 
system, or attempting to access a file via a malformed symlink on such a 
file system. Many distributions allow local users to mount CDs, which 
makes them potentially vulnerable to local elevation attacks.

Vulnerable Code:
The relevant functions are as follows:

fs/isofs/rock.c: rock_ridge_symlink_readpage()
fs/isofs/rock.c: get_symlink_chunk()

There is no checking that the total length of the symlink being read is 
less than the memory space that has been allocated for storing it. By 
supplying many CE (continuation) records, each with another SL (symlink) 
chunk, it is possible for an attacker to build an arbitrary length data 
structure in kernel memory space. A proof of concept exploit has been 
written that allows a local user to
gain root level access. It is also possible to cause execution of code 
with kernel privileges.

In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be able to mount 
a maliciously constructed file system. This may be accomplished by the 
following:

 * Having an account on the machine to be compromised and inserting a 
malformed disk. Some distributions allow local users to mount removable 
media without needing to be root and with some configurations. This 
happens automatically when a disk is inserted. The proof of concept 
exploit works from floppy disk as well as CD-ROM. If the attacker can 
reboot the machine from his or her own media or supply command line 
options to the kernel during the initialization process after rebooting, 
exploiting this vulnerability may not be necessary to gain further access. 
In this situation, the attacker will not be able to directly access any 
encrypted file systems.

 * If encrypted virtual file systems are implemented, and the attacker 
gains access to an account able to mount one, then an attacker may be able 
to mount his or her own maliciously formed file system via the encryption 
interface. This would allow them access to any already mounted file 
systems.

 * Being root already. If the attacker has already gained root, but the 
kernel has some form of patch preventing root being able to perform 
certain functions, he or she may still be able to mount a file system. As 
the vulnerability occurs in kernel space, it may be possible for them to 
neutralize the restrictions.

Workaround:
Disable user mounting of removable media devices.

Vendor Status:
Slackware:
"Slackware will be waiting for a new upstream kernel version that will 
address this issue.  None of our existing releases allow a non-root user 
to mount a CD-ROM, and the exploit requires physical access to the 
machine"

SuSE:
"SuSE Security have published a SuSE Security Announcement at  
<http://www.suse.de/security/>; http://www.suse.de/security/ and update 
packages that fix the vulnerability. The update packages are available for 
download at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update//rpm/i586/, but we 
encourage our users to make use of the YOU (Yast Online Update) utility 
for quick and secure installation of security updates."

Debian:
 <http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-479>; 
http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-479   alpha+ia32+powerpc
 <http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-480>; 
http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-480   hppa
 <http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-481>; 
http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-481   ia64
 <http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-482>; 
http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-482   powerpc/apus
 <http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-483>; 
http://www.security.debian.org/2004/dsa-483   mips+mipsel

Mandrake Linux:
MDKSA-2004:029  
<www.mandrakesecure.net/en/advisories/advisory.php?name=MDKSA-2004:029> 
www.mandrakesecure.net/en/advisories/advisory.php?name=MDKSA-2004:029

Disclosure Timeline:
January 9, 2004 Exploit acquired by iDEFENSE
February 20, 2004 Initial vendor notification
February 20, 2004 iDEFENSE clients notified
April 14, 2004 Coordinated public disclosure


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  
<mailto:[email protected]> iDEFENSE.




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