The OpenNET Project
 
Search (keywords):  SOFT ARTICLES TIPS & TRICKS SECURITY
LINKS NEWS MAN DOCUMENTATION


[NT] Fastream NETFile FTP/Web Server Directory Traversal


<< Previous INDEX Search src Set bookmark Go to bookmark Next >>
From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 27 Apr 2005 17:43:19 +0200
Subject: [NT] Fastream NETFile FTP/Web Server Directory Traversal
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <20050427145014.D8D43574F@mail.tyumen.ru.>
X-Virus-Scanned: antivirus-gw at tyumen.ru

The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion

The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html 

- - - - - - - - -




  Fastream NETFile FTP/Web Server Directory Traversal
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

 <http://www.fastream.com/netfileserver.htm>; Fastream NETFile FTP/Web 
Server is "a secure FTP server and Web server combined together in one 
program. It claims to be the 'easiest to setup and administer server' on 
the Internet".

A directory traversal vulnerability was found in NETFile FTP's web 
interface. This vulnerability may be exploited by a user with file 
upload/delete privileges to upload/delete files outside the FTP root, or 
by a user with directory create/remove privileges to create/remove 
directories outside the FTP root.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Fastream NETFile FTP/Web Server version 7.4.6

Immune Systems:
 * Fastream NETFile FTP/Web Server version 7.5.0 Beta 7

The problem lies in the insufficient filtering of the filename input 
parameter before it is used. When the request is received, the value of 
the filename parameter is first concatenated to the name of the FTP root 
directory.

Suppose the FTP root is C:\NFRoot, the concatenated filename will be 
C:\NFRoot\.../..//a/.../yyy.txt. This concatenated filename is then passed 
to the GetFullPathName() Windows API function and the resulting output is 
C:\NFRoot\a\..\yyy.txt. This output satisfies a directory validation check 
since it lies within the FTP root.

As a comparison, if the value of filename is ../..//a/.../yyy.txt (using 
two preceding dots instead of three), the resulting output from 
GetFullPathName() will be C:\a\..\yyy.txt. This will fail the directory 
validation check.

If the output from GetFullPathName() satisfies the directory validation 
check, the AbsolutePath function will be called. This function simplifies 
the original supplied filename by removing directory traversal sequences. 
For example, the filename /dir1/dir2/../file.txt will be simplified to 
/dir1/file.txt. i.e. A loop will remove sequences of the type 
"/dirname/..".

To exploit this vulnerability, the value of filename must satisfy the 
directory validation check, and must contain directory traversal sequences 
that can survive the pathname simplification process. The filenames used 
in the examples above have been crafted to meet both criteria. The 
simplification process is illustrated below.

All forward slashes will be converted to backward slashes by a call to 
UnixPathToDosPath before AbsolutePath is called.

..\..\\a\...\yyy.txt // initial
\a\...\yyy.txt  // after first pass
.\yyy.txt  // after second pass

The loop will terminate when the sequence "\.." does not appear in the 
string.  Hence, "..\yyy.txt" results.

Workaround:
Disable the web interface or allow only trusted users to upload/delete 
files and create/remove directories.

Disclosure Timeline:
17 Apr 05 - Vulnerability Discovered
21 Apr 05 - Initial Vendor Notification
21 Apr 05 - Initial Vendor Reply
21 Apr 05 - Vendor Provided 7.5.0 Beta 6 for Testing
21 Apr 05 - Informed Vendor that File-Upload Directory Traversal is not 
Fixed
22 Apr 05 - Vendor Provided 7.5.0 Beta 7 for Testing
25 Apr 05 - Public Release


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:chewkeong@security.org.sg.> 
Chew Keong TAN.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://www.security.org.sg/vuln/netfileftp746.html>; 
http://www.security.org.sg/vuln/netfileftp746.html




This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: [email protected] In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: [email protected]

DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.

<< Previous INDEX Search src Set bookmark Go to bookmark Next >>



Партнёры:
PostgresPro
Inferno Solutions
Hosting by Hoster.ru
Хостинг:

Закладки на сайте
Проследить за страницей
Created 1996-2025 by Maxim Chirkov
Добавить, Поддержать, Вебмастеру