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[UNIX] Telnetd Allows Login as Arbitrary User


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From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 4 Apr 2007 17:06:39 +0200
Subject: [UNIX] Telnetd Allows Login as Arbitrary User
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  Telnetd Allows Login as Arbitrary User
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

The MIT krb5 telnet daemon (telnetd) allows unauthorized login as an 
arbitrary user, when presented with a specially crafted username. 
Exploitation of this vulnerability is trivial.

This is a vulnerability in an application program; it is not a bug in the 
MIT krb5 libraries or in the Kerberos protocol.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * telnetd in all releases of MIT krb5, up to and including krb5-1.6

Immune Systems:
 * telnetd in all releases of MIT krb5 krb5-1.6.1

Impact:
A user can gain unauthorized access to any account (including root) on a 
host running telnetd. Whether the attacker needs to authenticate depends 
on the configuration of telnetd on that host.

Fixes:
 * The upcoming krb5-1.6.1 release will contain a fix for this 
vulnerability.

Prior to that release you may:

 * disable telnetd


or

 * apply the patch
This patch is also available at  
<http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-001-patch.txt>; 
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-001-patch.txt


A PGP-signed patch is available at  
<http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-001-patch.txt.asc>; 
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2007-001-patch.txt.asc

  • src/appl/telnet/telnetd/state.c (revision 19480) --- src/appl/telnet/telnetd/state.c (local) ***************
  • 1665,1671 **** strcmp(varp, "RESOLV_HOST_CONF") && /* linux */ strcmp(varp, "NLSPATH") && /* locale stuff */ strncmp(varp, "LC_", strlen("LC_")) && /* locale stuff */ ! strcmp(varp, "IFS")) { return 1; } else { syslog(LOG_INFO, "Rejected the attempt to modify the environment variable \"%s\"", varp); --- 1665,1672 ---- strcmp(varp, "RESOLV_HOST_CONF") && /* linux */ strcmp(varp, "NLSPATH") && /* locale stuff */ strncmp(varp, "LC_", strlen("LC_")) && /* locale stuff */ ! strcmp(varp, "IFS") && ! !strchr(varp, '-')) { return 1; } else { syslog(LOG_INFO, "Rejected the attempt to modify the environment variable \"%s\"", varp);
  • src/appl/telnet/telnetd/sys_term.c (revision 19480) --- src/appl/telnet/telnetd/sys_term.c (local) ***************
  • 1287,1292 **** --- 1287,1302 ---- #endif #if defined (AUTHENTICATION) if (auth_level >= 0 && autologin == AUTH_VALID) { + if (name[0] == '-') { + /* Authenticated and authorized to log in to an + account starting with '-'? Even if that + unlikely case comes to pass, the current login + program will not parse the resulting command + line properly. */ + syslog(LOG_ERR, "user name cannot start with '-'"); + fatal(net, "user name cannot start with '-'"); + exit(1); + } # if !defined(NO_LOGIN_F) #if defined(LOGIN_CAP_F) argv = addarg(argv, "-F"); ***************
  • 1377,1387 **** } else #endif if (getenv("USER")) { ! argv = addarg(argv, getenv("USER")); #if defined(LOGIN_ARGS) && defined(NO_LOGIN_P) { register char **cpp; for (cpp = environ; *cpp; cpp++) argv = addarg(argv, *cpp); } #endif --- 1387,1405 ---- } else #endif if (getenv("USER")) { ! char *user = getenv("USER"); ! if (user[0] == '-') { ! /* "telnet -l-x ..." */ ! syslog(LOG_ERR, "user name cannot start with '-'"); ! fatal(net, "user name cannot start with '-'"); ! exit(1); ! } ! argv = addarg(argv, user); #if defined(LOGIN_ARGS) && defined(NO_LOGIN_P) { register char **cpp; for (cpp = environ; *cpp; cpp++) + if ((*cpp)[0] != '-') argv = addarg(argv, *cpp); } #endif CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-0956>; CVE-2007-0956 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:tlyu@mit.edu.> Tom Yu. The original article can be found at: <http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2007-001-telnetd.txt>; http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2007-001-telnetd.txt
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