Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2008 12:57:22 +0100
From: Moritz Jodeit <moritz@jodeit.org.>
To: [email protected]Subject: ClamAV get_unicode_name() off-by-one buffer overflow
Message-ID: <20081108115722.GA4659@fugu1.local.>
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X-Virus-Scanned: antivirus-gw at tyumen.ru
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ClamAV get_unicode_name() off-by-one buffer overflow
Copyright (c) 2008 Moritz Jodeit <moritz@jodeit.org.> (2008/11/08)
Application details:
From http://www.clamav.net/:
"Clam AntiVirus is an open source (GPL) anti-virus toolkit for UNIX,
designed especially for e-mail scanning on mail gateways. It provides
a number of utilities including a flexible and scalable multi-threaded
daemon, a command line scanner and advanced tool for automatic
database updates. The core of the package is an anti-virus engine
available in a form of shared library."
Vulnerability description:
ClamAV contains an off-by-one heap overflow vulnerability in the
code responsible for parsing VBA project files. Successful
exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with
the privileges of the `clamd' process by sending an email with a
prepared attachment.
The vulnerability occurs inside the get_unicode_name() function
in libclamav/vba_extract.c when a specific `name' buffer is passed
to it.
101 static char *
102 get_unicode_name(const char *name, int size, int big_endian)
103 {
104 int i, increment;
105 char *newname, *ret;
106
107 if((name == NULL) || (*name == '\0') || (size <= 0))
108 return NULL;
109
110 newname = (char *)cli_malloc(size * 7);
First the `size' of the `name' buffer multiplied by 7 is used to
allocate the destination buffer `newname'. When the `name' buffer
only consists of characters matching some specific criteria [1]
and `big_endian' is set, the following loop can write exactly 7
characters into the allocated destination buffer `newname' per
character found in source buffer `name'.
This effectively fills up the destination buffer completely. After
the loop in line 143, the terminating NUL byte is written and
overflows the allocated buffer on the heap.
143 *ret = '\0';
144
145 /* Saves a lot of memory */
146 ret = cli_realloc(newname, (ret - newname) + 1);
147 return ret ? ret : newname;
148 }
[1] Every character matching the following condition results in
7 characters written to the destination buffer:
(c & 0x80 || !isprint(c)) && (c >= 10 || c < 0)
A VBA project file embedded inside an OLE2 office document send
as an attachment can trigger the off-by-one.
Vendor response:
2008/10/16 Initial report to vendor
2008/10/16 Vulnerability acknowledged by [email protected]
2008/11/03 Release of version 0.94.1
Vulnerable packages:
All versions up to 0.94 are vulnerable.
Version 0.94.1 fixes the problem.
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