Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2003 16:52:18 -0659
From: David Thiel <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]Subject: Solaris syslogd overflow
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Synopsis:
Solaris syslogd is vulnerable to a remote buffer overflow.
Versions:
Solaris 2.6 SPARC: Not vulnerable
Solaris 2.7 SPARC/x86: Untested
Solaris 8 SPARC: Vulnerable
Solaris 8 x86: Vulnerable
Solaris 9 SPARC: Not vulnerable
Solaris 9 x86: Untested
=09
Impact:
Low-Medium.
While I've not been able to craft an exploit that successfully
executes arbitrary code, it may still be possible. If
not, this can be used to hide evidence of attack or intrusion
in environments where a central logging server is used.
Description:
In Solaris 8, syslogd dumps core when receiving a UDP packet
larger than 1024 bytes, instead of truncating it, as dictated=20
by RFC3164, section 6.1. =20
Fix:
Sun Microsystems released patch 110945-08 for SPARC and
110946 for x86, which resolves this problem (identified as
bug #4812764) on 2003-05-29. Obviously, any systems not
using syslogd to log from remote hosts should be run with
the -t flag. Alternatively, consider switching to a more
reliable logging system, such as Gerrit Pape's socklog.
Timeline:
2003-01-18: Problem discovered, platforms tested.
2003-01-21: Sun Security Coordination Team notified.
2003-02-04: Sun confirms the problem and assigns bug ID.
2003-05-29: Patch released.
References:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/findPatch.pl?patchId=3D110945&rev=3D08
If anyone else is able to do anything more interesting with this bug,=20
I'd like to hear about it.
Cheers,
lx
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