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[UNIX] Sun Microsystems Solaris ld.so 'doprf()' Buffer Overflow Vulnerability


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From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 19 Dec 2006 10:46:32 +0200
Subject: [UNIX] Sun Microsystems Solaris ld.so 'doprf()' Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
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  Sun Microsystems Solaris ld.so 'doprf()' Buffer Overflow Vulnerability


SUMMARY

Solaris is a UNIX operating system developed by Sun Microsystems. Local 
exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in ld.so could potentially 
allow a non root user to execute arbitrary code as root.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Solaris 10 for both x86 and SPARC

ld.so is vulnerable to a buffer overflow in its internal doprf() 
formatting function. A fixed size stack buffer is used to store the 
precision padding characters when printing out a numerical format 
specifier. The vulnerable code was taken from the OpenSolaris source, and 
is as follows:

size_t
doprf(const char *format, va_list args, Prfbuf *prf)
{
    char    c;
    char    *bp = prf->pr_cur;
    char    *bufend = prf->pr_buf + prf->pr_len;
    size_t  bufsiz = prf->pr_len;

    while ((c = *format++) != '\0') {
        if (c != '%') {
            PUTC(c);
        } else {
            int base = 0, flag = 0, width = 0, prec = 0;
            size_t  _i;
            int _c, _n;
            char    *_s;
            int ls = 0;

* snip *


            if (base) {
1]             char        local[20];
                const char  *string =
                            MSG_ORIG(MSG_STR_HEXNUM);
                size_t      ssize = 0, psize = 0;
                const char  *prefix =
                            MSG_ORIG(MSG_STR_EMPTY);
                u_longlong_t    num;


* snip *


                /*
                 * Convert the numeric value into a local
                 * string (stored in reverse order).
                 */
                _s = local;
2]            do {
                    *_s++ = string[num % base];
                    num /= base;
                    ssize++;
                } while (num);
                
                /*
                 * Provide any precision or width padding.
                 */
                if (prec) {
                    /* LINTED */
                    _n = (int)(prec - ssize);
3]                while (_n-- > 0) {
                        *_s++ = '0';
                        ssize++;
                    }
                }


1) This is the stack buffer that will later be overflowed.

2) Here the given number is stored into the buffer.  There is no chance 
for an overflow here as the maximum number of digits in a long long int is 
20 bytes.

3) However in this loop an attacker can freely overwrite the stack with 
'0' (0x30) bytes.

This vulnerability would normally not be able to be triggered by a non 
root user. The doprf() function is only supposed to be passed format 
strings from a message file owned by root. However, when this 
vulnerability is combined with the ld.so directory traversal vulnerability 
any user can pass arbitrary format strings to the doprf() function.

Analysis:
Successful local exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code 
as root on the affected host by running a setuid binary.

Exploitation is difficult due to the limited data value with which the 
buffer can be overflowed. It is necessary to have valid memory mapped at 
an address with a most significant byte of 0x30, for example 0x30fffff0. 
In our tests on both x86 and SPARC architectures we were unable to achieve 
this. With a different memory layout exploitation may be possible.  On 
x86, it also may be possible to overwrite the low byte of a saved frame 
pointer if the registers are allocated in a different way.

Vendor Response:
Sun Microsystems has addressed this problem with new patches. More 
information can be found in Sun Alert #102724. This alert can be found at: 
 <http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-102724-1>; 
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-102724-1

Disclosure Timeline:
10/24/2006 - Initial vendor notification
10/27/2006 - Initial vendor response
12/12/2006 - Coordinated public disclosure


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com.> iDefense Labs Security Advisories.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=450>; 
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=450




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