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[NEWS] Buffer Overflow in Mozilla Browser Firefox (Heap Corruption)


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From: SecuriTeam <support@securiteam.com.>
To: [email protected]
Date: 15 Mar 2005 16:13:00 +0200
Subject: [NEWS] Buffer Overflow in Mozilla Browser Firefox (Heap Corruption)
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  Buffer Overflow in Mozilla Browser Firefox (Heap Corruption)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

Remote exploitation of a design error allows an attacker to cause heap 
corruption in the Mozilla browser as well as in Mozilla Firefox, resulting 
in execution of arbitrary code.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Mozilla Suite version 1.7.3
 * Thunderbird version 1.0
 * Mozilla Firefox version 1.0

Immune Systems:
 * Mozilla Suite version 1.7.6
 * Thunderbird version 1.0.1
 * Mozilla Firefox version 1.0.1

The vulnerability specifically exists in string handling functions, such 
as nsCSubstring::Append, which rely on functions in the file 
mozilla/xpcom/string/src/nsTSubstring.cpp. Certain functions, such as 
nsTSubstring_CharT::Replace() fail to check the return value of functions 
which resize the string.

xpcom/string/src/nsTSubstring.cpp:
1. size_type length = tuple.Length();
 cutStart = PR_MIN(cutStart, Length());

2. ReplacePrep(cutStart, cutLength, length);

3. if (length > 0)
 tuple.WriteTo(mData + cutStart, length);

At [1], length is set to the length of the string to be copied, which is 
the passed to ReplacePrep() at [2]. If the reallocation performed by this 
function fails sets mData to a fixed address.
mData = NS_CONST_CAST(char_type*, char_traits::sEmptyBuffer);
mLength = 0;

The value of sEmptyBuffer is set in xpcom/string/src/nsSubstring.cpp:
static const PRUnichar gNullChar = 0;
const char* nsCharTraits<char> ::sEmptyBuffer = (const char*) &gNullChar;

As the return value is not checked, if the function fails mData is 
pointing at a known memory location. By causing memory to be consumed 
until an out of memory condition occurs, and controlling the value of  the 
string to append, it is possible at [3] to cause arbitrary data to be 
placed in a known location, allowing execution of arbitrary code.

This vulnerability would rely on both knowing the version of the browser, 
which could be obtained from the User-Agent string passed to a malicious 
server, and being able to cause memory exhaustion. It may be possible to 
cause memory exhaustion remotely by either sending a large amount of data 
to the client in the headers, which would require a large amount of 
bandwidth or by using compression to reduce the amount of data that needs 
to be sent to the client, either via a server module like the Apache HTTPd 
mod_deflate, or a file such as a ZIP file referenced by a jar: URI. It 
also may be possible to use a JavaScript to allocate enough memory to 
trigger this vulnerability.

As this vulnerability is triggered in an out of memory condition, it may 
be easier to exploit on systems which have restricted the amount of memory 
a user or process may use.

Vendor Status:
The vendor has confirmed the bug:  
<http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-18.html>; 
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-18.html
The problem had been fixed with new versions of Mozilla's products.

Disclosure Timeline:
02/09/2005 - Initial vendor notification
02/09/2005 - Initial vendor response
02/28/2005 - Coordinated public disclosure


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:labs-no-reply@idefense.com.> 
iDEFENSE Labs.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=200&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=true>; http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=200&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=true




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