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Archive-name: pgp-faq/part3 Posting-Frequency: monthly Last-modified: 22 June 1995 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ======================================================================== Appendix I - PGP add-ons and Related Programs ======================================================================== Due to the enormous size this FAQ has begun to take, I have condensed this section, using a home-grown format that (I hope) will be easy to machine-parse into whatever other formats I can manage. This list is not exhaustive, nor is it even necessarily correct. Much of it is lifted from the old FAQ, and, as a result, some of the links are probably out of date. Hopefully, I will be able to weed out the bad links and update this over time; the task was too great for me to take immediately, however, especially given the pressing need. I present it in the hope that it will be helpful. ======== Amiga ======== PGP Mail Integration Project Author: Peter Simons <[email protected]> ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/comm/mail/PGPMIP.lha ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/comm/mail/PGPMIT.readme Automatic PGP encryption for mail over UUCP and SMTP. - ----- PGPAmiga-FrontEnd Author: Peter Simons <[email protected]> GUI front end for Amiga PGP. - ----- StealthPGP 1.0 ftp://ftp.uni-erlangen.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/StealthPGP1_0.lha Tool to remove any header stuff from PGP encrypted messages, to make sure nobody recognizes it as encrypted text. Source included. - ----- PGPMore 2.3 ftp://ftp.uni-erlangen.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPMore2_3.lha More-like tool which decrypts PGP encrypted blocks included in the text before displaying them. Useful for decrypting complete mail folders, etc... ======== Archimedes ======== PGPwimp Author: Peter Gaunt ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ A multi-tasking WIMP front-end for PGP (requires RISC OS 3). Operates on files - it has no hooks to allow integration with mailers/newsreaders. - ----- RNscripts4PGP Author: [email protected] (Paul L. Allen) ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ A collection of scripts and a small BASIC program which integrate PGP with the ReadNews mailer/newsreader. Provides encryp, decrypt, sign signature- check, add key. ======== DOS (Windows utilities are in a separate section) ======== Offline AutoPGP Author: Stale Schumacher <[email protected]> ftp://oak.oakland.edu/pub/msdos/security/apgp212.zip http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/AutoPGP/ Integrates PGP with QWK and SOUP offline mail readers. - ----- PGPSort Author: Stale Schumacher <[email protected]> ftp://oak.oakland.edu/pub/msdos/security/pgpsort.zip http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/PGP/PGPSort.html Sorts your PGP public keyring. - ----- HPack ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/arcers/hpack79.zip ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/doc-soft/hpack79d.zip ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/source/hpack79s.zip ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/unix/arcers/hpack79src.tar.Z Archiver program (like ZIP) which integrates PGP. - ----- Menu ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/menu.zip Menu shell for PGP which uses 4DOS. - ----- OzPKE CompuServe: EFFSIG lib 15, OZCIS lib 7, EURFORUM lib 1 Integrates PGP into OzCIS, an automated access program for CompuServe. - ----- PGP-Front Author: Walter H. van Holst <[email protected]> ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it:/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgpfront.zip Interactive shell for PGP; has most functions. - ----- PGPShell Author: James Still <[email protected]> ftp://oak.oakland.edu/pub/msdos/security/pgpshe33.zip mailto:[email protected] (subject "send shell") Another PGP shell for DOS. - ----- PGS ftp://oak.oakland.edu/pub/msdos/security/ Pretty Good PGP Shell or PGS is a complete shell for Philip Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PGS enables you to do anything that PGP can do from the commandline from a, easy to use, front-end shell. - ----- PGPUtils ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgputils.zip Batch files and PIF files for PGP. - ----- PC Yarn Author: Chin Huang <[email protected]> ftp://oak.oakland.edu/SimTel/msdos/offline/yarn_0xx.zip (xx is version number) MS-DOS offline mail and news software (using the SOUP packet format) that can clearsign or encrypt outgoing messages, and decrypt incoming messages to the CRT, a text file, or a mail folder. ======== MAC ======== ======== NeXT ======== CryptorBundle ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/comp/platforms/next/Mail/apps/ CryptorBundle-1.0.NI.b.tar.gz Integrates PGP into Mail.app. ======== OS/2 ======== EPM Macro for PGP Author: John C. Frickson <[email protected]> ftp://ftp.gibbon.com/pub/gcp/gcppgp10.zip Macro for EPM which places a PGP menu in the menu bar. ======== Unix ======== PGPsendmail ftp://ftp.atnf.csiro.au/pub/people/rgooch/ ftp://ftp.dhp.com/pub/crypto/pgp/PGPsendmail/ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp/utils/ Automatically encrypts by acting as a wrapper for sendmail. - ----- PGPTalk ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgptalk.zip Integrates PGP into ytalk for secure private chatting. - ----- Emacs Auto-PGP Author: Ian Jackson <[email protected]> This is a package for integrating PGP into GNU Emacs. - ----- Mailcrypt Author: [email protected] (Jin S Choi), [email protected] (Patrick J. LoPresti) ftp://cag.lcs.mit.edu/pub/patl/mailcrypt/ This is an elisp package for encrypting and decrypting mail. I wrote this to provide a single interface to the two most common mail encryption programs, PGP and RIPEM. You can use either or both in any combination. - ----- mail-secure.el Author: Travis J. I. Corcoran ([email protected]) mailto: [email protected] Complement to Mailcrypt which adds some new features. Requires Mailcrypt. - ----- PGPPAGER Author: [email protected] (Alessandro Bottonelli) This program acts as a smart pager for mail, and can automatically decrypt the body portion of a message if necessary. - ----- mkpgp mailto:[email protected] (auto-replies the mkpgp program; use Subject: mkpgp) Script for integrating pine and PGP. - ----- PGP Elm Author: Kenneth H. Cox <[email protected]> ftp://ftp.viewlogic.com/pub/elm-2.4pl24pgp3.tar.gz Patched version of elm which is PGP-aware. - ----- PGP Augmented Messaging (was PGP Enhanced Messaging) Author: Rick Busdiecker <[email protected]> ftp://h.gp.cs.cmu.edu/usr/rfb/pem/ Another set of GNU Emacs PGP utilities. ======== VAX/VMS ======== ENCRYPT.COM Author: [email protected] (John O'Leary) ENCRYPT.COM is a VMS mail script that works fine for [email protected] (John O'Leary) ======== Windows (v3, '95, NT) ======== PGP Help for the Windows Help engine Author: Jeff Sheets <[email protected]> http://netaccess.on.ca/~rbarclay/pgp.html PGP documentation and help in WinHelp format. - ----- PGPWinFront (PWF) Author: Ross Barclay <[email protected]> http://netaccess.on.ca/~rbarclay/index.html mailto:[email protected] (put GET PWF in subject) Windows front end for PGP. Includes most functions. - ----- J's Windows PGP Shell (JWPS) ftp://oak.oakland.edu/pub/msdos/security/ Another Windows front end for PGP. Supports drag-n-drop, clipboard, etc. - ----- PGP Windows ftp://oak.oakland.edu/pub/msdos/security/pgpwin.zip Still another Windows PGP front end. - ----- WinPGP(tm) ftp://ftp.firstnet.net/pub/windows/winpgp/pgpw40.zip http://www.firstnet.net/~cwgeib/welcome.html Another PGP Windows shell; this one is shareware. - ----- ZMail Scripts for PGP Author: Guy Berliner <[email protected]> ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/be/berliner/readme.html ftp://kaiwan.com/user/mckinnon/pgp4zm.zip Scripts for integrating PGP with ZMail, a popular graphical mailer. - ----- Private Idaho ftp://ftp.eskimo.com/joelm/pidaho21.zip http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ A PGP integration tool for various Windows mailers. Supports anonymous remailers. - ----- S-Tools Author: Andy Brown <[email protected]> ftp://mirage.nexor.co.uk/pub/security/steganography/s-tools3.zip A set of Windows steganography tools. ======================================================================== Appendix II - Glossary of Cryptographic Terms ======================================================================== ======== Chosen Plain Text Attack ======== This is the next step up from the Known Plain Text Attack. In this version, the cryptanalyst can choose what plain text message he wishes to encrypt and view the results, as opposed to simply taking any old plain text that he might happen to lay his hands on. If he can recover the key, he can use it to decode all data encrypted under this key. This is a much stronger form of attack than known plain text. The better encryption systems will resist this form of attack. ======== Clipper ======== A chip developed by the United States Government that was to be used as the standard chip in all encrypted communications. Aside from the fact that all details of how the Clipper chip work remain classified, the biggest concern was the fact that it has an acknowledged trap door in it to allow the government to eavesdrop on anyone using Clipper provided they first obtained a wiretap warrant. This fact, along with the fact that it can't be exported from the United States, has led a number of large corporations to oppose the idea. Clipper uses an 80 bit key to perform a series of nonlinear transformation on a 64 bit data block. ======== DES (Data Encryption Standard) ======== A data encryption standard developed by IBM under the auspices of the United States Government. It was criticized because the research that went into the development of the standard remained classified. Concerns were raised that there might be hidden trap doors in the logic that would allow the government to break anyone's code if they wanted to listen in. DES uses a 56 bit key to perform a series of nonlinear transformation on a 64 bit data block. Even when it was first introduced a number of years ago, it was criticized for not having a long enough key. 56 bits just didn't put it far enough out of reach of a brute force attack. Today, with the increasing speed of hardware and its falling cost, it would be feasible to build a machine that could crack a 56 bit key in under a day's time. It is not known if such a machine has really been built, but the fact that it is feasible tends to weaken the security of DES substantially. I would like to thank Paul Leyland <[email protected]> for the following information relating to the cost of building such a DES cracking machine: _Efficient DES Key Search_ At Crypto 93, Michael Wiener gave a paper with the above title. He showed how a DES key search engine could be built for $1 million which can do exhaustive search in 7 hours. Expected time to find a key from a matching pair of 64-bit plaintext and 64-bit ciphertext is 3.5 hours. So far as I can tell, the machine is scalable, which implies that a $100M machine could find keys every couple of minutes or so. The machine is fairly reliable: an error analysis implies that the mean time between failure is about 270 keys. The final sentence in the abstract is telling: In the light of this work, it would be prudent in many applications to use DES in triple- encryption mode. I only have portions of a virtually illegible FAX copy, so please don't ask me for much more detail. A complete copy of the paper is being snailed to me. Paul C. Leyland <[email protected]> Laszlo Baranyi <[email protected]> says that the full paper is available in PostScript from: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/crypto/des_key_search.ps ftp://cpsr.org/cpsr/crypto/des/des_key_search.ps (cpsr.org also makes it available via their Gopher service) ======== EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) ======== The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) was founded in July, 1990, to assure freedom of expression in digital media, with a particular emphasis on applying the principles embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to computer-based communication. For further information, contact: Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G St., NW Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001 +1 202 347 5400 +1 202 393 5509 FAX Internet: [email protected] ======== IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) ======== Developed in Switzerland and licensed for non-commercial use in PGP. IDEA uses a 128 bit user supplied key to perform a series of nonlinear mathematical transformations on a 64 bit data block. Compare the length of this key with the 56 bits in DES or the 80 bits in Clipper. ======== ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) ======== ITAR are the regulations covering the exporting of weapons and weapons related technology from the United States. For some strange reason, the government claims that data encryption is a weapon and comes under the ITAR regulations. There is presently a move in Congress to relax the section of ITAR dealing with cryptographic technology. ======== Known Plain Text Attack ======== A method of attack on a crypto system where the cryptanalyst has matching copies of plain text, and its encrypted version. With weaker encryption systems, this can improve the chances of cracking the code and getting at the plain text of other messages where the plain text is not known. ======== MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm #5) ======== The message digest algorithm used in PGP is the MD5 Message Digest Algorithm, placed in the public domain by RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5's designer, Ronald Rivest, writes this about MD5: "It is conjectured that the difficulty of coming up with two messages having the same message digest is on the order of 2^64 operations, and that the difficulty of coming up with any message having a given message digest is on the order of 2^128 operations. The MD5 algorithm has been carefully scrutinized for weaknesses. It is, however, a relatively new algorithm and further security analysis is of course justified, as is the case with any new proposal of this sort. The level of security provided by MD5 should be sufficient for implementing very high security hybrid digital signature schemes based on MD5 and the RSA public-key cryptosystem." ======== MPILIB (Multiple Precision Integer Library) ======== This is the common name for the set of RSA routines used in PGP 2.3a and previous, as well as the international versions of PGP. It is alleged to violate PKP's RSA patent in the USA, but is not otherwise restricted in usage. It retains its popularity abroad because it outperforms RSAREF and has fewer legal restrictions as well. ======== NSA (National Security Agency) ======== The following information is from the sci.crypt FAQ: The NSA is the official communications security body of the U.S. government. It was given its charter by President Truman in the early 50's, and has continued research in cryptology till the present. The NSA is known to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the world, and is also the largest purchaser of computer hardware in the world. Governments in general have always been prime employers of cryptologists. The NSA probably possesses cryptographic expertise many years ahead of the public state of the art, and can undoubtedly break many of the systems used in practice; but for reasons of national security almost all information about the NSA is classified. ======== One Time Pad ======== The one time pad is the ONLY encryption scheme that can be proven to be absolutely unbreakable! It is used extensively by spies because it doesn't require any hardware to implement and because of its absolute security. This algorithm requires the generation of many sets of matching encryption keys pads. Each pad consists of a number of random key characters. These key characters are chosen completely at random using some truly random process. They are NOT generated by any kind of cryptographic key generator. Each party involved receives matching sets of pads. Each key character in the pad is used to encrypt one and only one plain text character, then the key character is never used again. Any violation of these conditions negates the perfect security available in the one time pad. So why don't we use the one time pad all the time? The answer is that the number of random key pads that need to be generated must be at least equal to the volume of plain text messages to be encrypted, and the fact that these key pads must somehow be exchanged ahead of time. This becomes totally impractical in modern high speed communications systems. Among the more famous of the communications links using a one time pad scheme is the Washington to Moscow hot line. ======== PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail) ======== The following was taken from the sci.crypt FAQ: How do I send encrypted mail under UNIX? [PGP, RIPEM, PEM, ...]? Here's one popular method, using the des command: cat file | compress | des private_key | uuencode | mail Meanwhile, there is a de jure Internet standard in the works called PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail). It is described in RFCs 1421 through 1424. To join the PEM mailing list, contact [email protected]. There is a beta version of PEM being tested at the time of this writing. There are also two programs available in the public domain for encrypting mail: PGP and RIPEM. Both are available by FTP. Each has its own news group: alt.security.pgp and alt.security.ripem. Each has its own FAQ as well. PGP is most commonly used outside the USA since it uses the RSA algorithm without a license and RSA's patent is valid only (or at least primarily) in the USA. [ Maintainer's note: The above paragraph is not fully correct, as MIT PGP uses RSAREF as well now. ] RIPEM is most commonly used inside the USA since it uses the RSAREF which is freely available within the USA but not available for shipment outside the USA. Since both programs use a secret key algorithm for encrypting the body of the message (PGP used IDEA; RIPEM uses DES) and RSA for encrypting the message key, they should be able to interoperate freely. Although there have been repeated calls for each to understand the other's formats and algorithm choices, no interoperation is available at this time (as far as we know). ======== PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) ======== The program we're discussing. See question 1.1. ======== PKP (Public Key Partners) ======== A patent holding company that holds many public-key patents, including (supposedly) the patent on public-key cryptography itself. Several of its patents are not believed by some to be valid, including their patent on RSA (which affects PGP). ======== RIPEM ======== See PEM ======== RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) ======== RSA is the public key encryption method used in PGP. RSA are the initials of the developers of the algorithm which was done at taxpayer expense. The basic security in RSA comes from the fact that, while it is relatively easy to multiply two huge prime numbers together to obtain their product, it is computationally difficult to go the reverse direction: to find the two prime factors of a given composite number. It is this one-way nature of RSA that allows an encryption key to be generated and disclosed to the world, and yet not allow a message to be decrypted. ======== RSAREF ======== This is the free library RSA Data Security, Inc., made available for the purpose of implementing freeware PEM applications. It implements several encryption algorithms, including (among others) RSA. MIT PGP uses RSAREF's RSA routines to avoid the alleged patent problems associated with other versions of PGP. ======== Skipjack ======== See Clipper ======== TEMPEST ======== TEMPEST is a standard for electromagnetic shielding for computer equipment. It was created in response to the fact that information can be read from computer radiation (e.g., from a CRT) at quite a distance and with little effort. Needless to say, encryption doesn't do much good if the cleartext is available this way. The typical home computer WOULD fail ALL of the TEMPEST standards by a long shot. So, if you are doing anything illegal, don't expect PGP or any other encryption program to save you. The government could just set up a monitoring van outside your home and read everything that you are doing on your computer. Short of shelling out the ten thousand dollars or so that it would take to properly shield your computer, a good second choice might be a laptop computer running on batteries. No emissions would be fed back into the power lines, and the amount of power being fed to the display and being consumed by the computer is much less than the typical home computer and CRT. This provides a much weaker RF field for snoopers to monitor. It still isn't safe, just safer. In addition, a laptop computer has the advantage of not being anchored to one location. Anyone trying to monitor your emissions would have to follow you around, maybe making themselves a little more obvious. I must emphasize again that a laptop still is NOT safe from a tempest standpoint, just safer than the standard personal computer. ======================================================================== Appendix III - Cypherpunks ======================================================================== ======== What are Cypherpunks? ======== ======== What is the cypherpunks mailing list? ======== Eric Hughes <[email protected]> runs the "cypherpunk" mailing list dedicated to "discussion about technological defenses for privacy in the digital domain." Frequent topics include voice and data encryption, anonymous remailers, and the Clipper chip. Send e-mail to [email protected] with "subscribe cypherpunks" in the body to be added or subtracted from the list. The mailing list itself is [email protected]. You don't need to be a member of the list in order to send messages to it, thus allowing the use of anonymous remailers to post your more sensitive messages that you just as soon would not be credited to you. (Traffic is sometimes up to 30-40 messages per day.) ======== What is the purpose of the Cypherpunk remailers? ======== The purpose of these remailers is to take privacy one level further. While a third party who is snooping on the net may not be able to read the encrypted mail that you are sending, he is still able to know who you are sending mail to. This could possibly give him some useful information. This is called traffic flow analysis. To counter this type of attack, you can use a third party whose function is simply to remail your message with his return address on it instead of yours. Two types of remailers exist. The first type only accepts plain text remailing headers. This type would only be used if your goal was only to prevent the person to whom your are sending mail from learning your identity. It would do nothing for the problem of net eavesdroppers from learning to whom you are sending mail. The second type of remailer accepts encrypted remailing headers. With this type of remailer, you encrypt your message twice. First, you encrypt it to the person ultimately receiving the message. You then add the remailing header and encrypt it again using the key for the remailer that you are using. When the remailer receives your message, the system will recognize that the header is encrypted and will use its secret decryption key to decrypt the message. He can now read the forwarding information, but because the body of the message is still encrypted in the key of another party, he is unable to read your mail. He simply remails the message to the proper destination. At its ultimate destination, the recipient uses his secret to decrypt this nested encryption and reads the message. Since this process of multiple encryptions and remailing headers can get quite involved, there are several programs available to simplify the process. FTP to soda.berkeley.edu and examine the directory /pub/cypherpunks/remailers for the programs that are available. ======== Where are the currently active Cypherpunk remailers? ======== Raph Levien maintains a list of currently active remailers. The list, unfortunately, seems to change often as remailers are shut down for whatever reasons; therefore, I am not printing a list here. You can get the list by fingering [email protected]. ======== Are there other anonymous remailers besides the cypherpunk remailers? ======== Yes, the most commonly used remailer on the Internet is in Finland. It is known as anon.penet.fi. The syntax for sending mail through this remailer is different from the cypherpunk remailers. For example, if you wanted to send mail to me ([email protected]) through anon.penet.fi, you would send the mail to "gbe%[email protected]". Notice that the "@" sign in my Internet address is changed to a "%". Unlike the cypherpunk remailers, anon.penet.fi directly supports anonymous return addresses. Anybody using the remailer is assigned an anonymous id of the form "an?????" where "?????" is filled in with a number representing that user. To send mail to someone when you only know their anonymous address, address your mail to "[email protected]" replacing the question marks with the user id you are interested in. For additional information on anon.penet.fi, send a blank message to "[email protected]". You will receive complete instructions on how to use the remailer, including how to obtain a pass phrase on the system. ======== What is the remailer command syntax? ======== The first non blank line in the message must start with two colons (::). The next line must contain the user defined header "Request-Remailing-To: <destination>". This line must be followed by a blank line. Finally, your message can occupy the rest of the space. As an example, if you wanted to send a message to me via a remailer, you would compose the following message: :: Request-Remailing-To: [email protected] [body of message] You would then send the above message to the desired remailer. Note the section labeled "body of message" may be either a plain text message, or an encrypted and armored PGP message addressed to the desired recipient. To send the above message with an encrypted header, use PGP to encrypt the entire message shown above to the desired remailer. Be sure to take the output in armored text form. In front of the BEGIN PGP MESSAGE portion of the file, insert two colons (::) as the first non-blank line of the file. The next line should say "Encrypted: PGP". Finally the third line should be blank. The message now looks as follows: :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version 2.3a [body of pgp message] -----END PGP MESSAGE----- You would then send the above message to the desired remailer just as you did in the case of the non-encrypted header. Note that it is possible to chain remailers together so that the message passes through several levels of anonymity before it reaches its ultimate destination. ======== Where can I learn more about Cypherpunks? ======== ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks ======================================================================= Appendix IV - Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to Congress. Reproduced by permission. ======================================================================= - From netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!sdd.hp.com!col.hp.com!csn!yuma!ld231782 Sun Oct 10 07:55:51 1993 Xref: netcom.com talk.politics.crypto:650 comp.org.eff.talk:20832 alt.politics.org.nsa:89 ~Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.politics.org.nsa Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!sdd.hp.com!col.hp.com!csn!yuma!ld231782 ~From: [email protected] (L. Detweiler) ~Subject: ZIMMERMANN SPEAKS TO HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ~Sender: [email protected] (News Account) Message-ID: <[email protected]> ~Date: Sun, 10 Oct 1993 04:42:12 GMT Nntp-Posting-Host: turner.lance.colostate.edu Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 ~Lines: 281 ~Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:57:54 MDT ~From: Philip Zimmermann <[email protected]> ~Subject: Zimmerman testimony to House subcommittee Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to Subcommittee for Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment US House of Representatives 12 Oct 1993 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Philip Zimmermann, and I am a software engineer who specializes in cryptography and data security. I'm here to talk to you today about the need to change US export control policy for cryptographic software. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here and commend you for your attention to this important issue. I am the author of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a public-key encryption software package for the protection of electronic mail. Since PGP was published domestically as freeware in June of 1991, it has spread organically all over the world and has since become the de facto worldwide standard for encryption of E-mail. The US Customs Service is investigating how PGP spread outside the US. Because I am a target of this ongoing criminal investigation, my lawyer has advised me not to answer any questions related to the investigation. I. The information age is here. Computers were developed in secret back in World War II mainly to break codes. Ordinary people did not have access to computers, because they were few in number and too expensive. Some people postulated that there would never be a need for more than half a dozen computers in the country. Governments formed their attitudes toward cryptographic technology during this period. And these attitudes persist today. Why would ordinary people need to have access to good cryptography? Another problem with cryptography in those days was that cryptographic keys had to be distributed over secure channels so that both parties could send encrypted traffic over insecure channels. Governments solved that problem by dispatching key couriers with satchels handcuffed to their wrists. Governments could afford to send guys like these to their embassies overseas. But the great masses of ordinary people would never have access to practical cryptography if keys had to be distributed this way. No matter how cheap and powerful personal computers might someday become, you just can't send the keys electronically without the risk of interception. This widened the feasibility gap between Government and personal access to cryptography. Today, we live in a new world that has had two major breakthroughs that have an impact on this state of affairs. The first is the coming of the personal computer and the information age. The second breakthrough is public-key cryptography. With the first breakthrough comes cheap ubiquitous personal computers, modems, FAX machines, the Internet, E-mail, digital cellular phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), wireless digital networks, ISDN, cable TV, and the data superhighway. This information revolution is catalyzing the emergence of a global economy. But this renaissance in electronic digital communication brings with it a disturbing erosion of our privacy. In the past, if the Government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation. This is analogous to catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. Fortunately for freedom and democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale. Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper mail, and is soon to be the norm for everyone, not the novelty is is today. Unlike paper mail, E-mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. This is analogous to driftnet fishing-- making a quantitative and qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy. The second breakthrough came in the late 1970s, with the mathematics of public key cryptography. This allows people to communicate securely and conveniently with people they've never met, with no prior exchange of keys over secure channels. No more special key couriers with black bags. This, coupled with the trappings of the information age, means the great masses of people can at last use cryptography. This new technology also provides digital signatures to authenticate transactions and messages, and allows for digital money, with all the implications that has for an electronic digital economy. (See appendix) This convergence of technology-- cheap ubiquitous PCs, modems, FAX, digital phones, information superhighways, et cetera-- is all part of the information revolution. Encryption is just simple arithmetic to all this digital hardware. All these devices will be using encryption. The rest of the world uses it, and they laugh at the US because we are railing against nature, trying to stop it. Trying to stop this is like trying to legislate the tides and the weather. It's like the buggy whip manufacturers trying to stop the cars-- even with the NSA on their side, it's still impossible. The information revolution is good for democracy-- good for a free market and trade. It contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire. They couldn't stop it either. Soon, every off-the-shelf multimedia PC will become a secure voice telephone, through the use of freely available software. What does this mean for the Government's Clipper chip and key escrow systems? Like every new technology, this comes at some cost. Cars pollute the air. Cryptography can help criminals hide their activities. People in the law enforcement and intelligence communities are going to look at this only in their own terms. But even with these costs, we still can't stop this from happening in a free market global economy. Most people I talk to outside of Government feel that the net result of providing privacy will be positive. President Clinton is fond of saying that we should "make change our friend". These sweeping technological changes have big implications, but are unstoppable. Are we going to make change our friend? Or are we going to criminalize cryptography? Are we going to incarcerate our honest, well-intentioned software engineers? Law enforcement and intelligence interests in the Government have attempted many times to suppress the availability of strong domestic encryption technology. The most recent examples are Senate Bill 266 which mandated back doors in crypto systems, the FBI Digital Telephony bill, and the Clipper chip key escrow initiative. All of these have met with strong opposition from industry and civil liberties groups. It is impossible to obtain real privacy in the information age without good cryptography. The Clinton Administration has made it a major policy priority to help build the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Yet, some elements of the Government seems intent on deploying and entrenching a communications infrastructure that would deny the citizenry the ability to protect its privacy. This is unsettling because in a democracy, it is possible for bad people to occasionally get elected-- sometimes very bad people. Normally, a well-functioning democracy has ways to remove these people from power. But the wrong technology infrastructure could allow such a future government to watch every move anyone makes to oppose it. It could very well be the last government we ever elect. When making public policy decisions about new technologies for the Government, I think one should ask oneself which technologies would best strengthen the hand of a police state. Then, do not allow the Government to deploy those technologies. This is simply a matter of good civic hygiene. II. Export controls are outdated and are a threat to privacy and economic competitivness. The current export control regime makes no sense anymore, given advances in technology. There has been considerable debate about allowing the export of implementations of the full 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES). At a recent academic cryptography conference, Michael Wiener of Bell Northern Research in Ottawa presented a paper on how to crack the DES with a special machine. He has fully designed and tested a chip that guesses DES keys at high speed until it finds the right one. Although he has refrained from building the real chips so far, he can get these chips manufactured for $10.50 each, and can build 57000 of them into a special machine for $1 million that can try every DES key in 7 hours, averaging a solution in 3.5 hours. $1 million can be hidden in the budget of many companies. For $10 million, it takes 21 minutes to crack, and for $100 million, just two minutes. That's full 56-bit DES, cracked in just two minutes. I'm sure the NSA can do it in seconds, with their budget. This means that DES is now effectively dead for purposes of serious data security applications. If Congress acts now to enable the export of full DES products, it will be a day late and a dollar short. If a Boeing executive who carries his notebook computer to the Paris airshow wants to use PGP to send email to his home office in Seattle, are we helping American competitivness by arguing that he has even potentially committed a federal crime? Knowledge of cryptography is becoming so widespread, that export controls are no longer effective at controlling the spread of this technology. People everywhere can and do write good cryptographic software, and we import it here but cannot export it, to the detriment of our indigenous software industry. I wrote PGP from information in the open literature, putting it into a convenient package that everyone can use in a desktop or palmtop computer. Then I gave it away for free, for the good of our democracy. This could have popped up anywhere, and spread. Other people could have and would have done it. And are doing it. Again and again. All over the planet. This technology belongs to everybody. III. People want their privacy very badly. PGP has spread like a prairie fire, fanned by countless people who fervently want their privacy restored in the information age. Today, human rights organizations are using PGP to protect their people overseas. Amnesty International uses it. The human rights group in the American Association for the Advancement of Science uses it. Some Americans don't understand why I should be this concerned about the power of Government. But talking to people in Eastern Europe, you don't have to explain it to them. They already get it-- and they don't understand why we don't. I want to read you a quote from some E-mail I got last week from someone in Latvia, on the day that Boris Yeltsin was going to war with his Parliament: "Phil I wish you to know: let it never be, but if dictatorship takes over Russia your PGP is widespread from Baltic to Far East now and will help democratic people if necessary. Thanks." Appendix -- How Public-Key Cryptography Works - --------------------------------------------- In conventional cryptosystems, such as the US Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES), a single key is used for both encryption and decryption. This means that a key must be initially transmitted via secure channels so that both parties have it before encrypted messages can be sent over insecure channels. This may be inconvenient. If you have a secure channel for exchanging keys, then why do you need cryptography in the first place? In public key cryptosystems, everyone has two related complementary keys, a publicly revealed key and a secret key. Each key unlocks the code that the other key makes. Knowing the public key does not help you deduce the corresponding secret key. The public key can be published and widely disseminated across a communications network. This protocol provides privacy without the need for the same kind of secure channels that a conventional cryptosystem requires. Anyone can use a recipient's public key to encrypt a message to that person, and that recipient uses her own corresponding secret key to decrypt that message. No one but the recipient can decrypt it, because no one else has access to that secret key. Not even the person who encrypted the message can decrypt it. Message authentication is also provided. The sender's own secret key can be used to encrypt a message, thereby "signing" it. This creates a digital signature of a message, which the recipient (or anyone else) can check by using the sender's public key to decrypt it. This proves that the sender was the true originator of the message, and that the message has not been subsequently altered by anyone else, because the sender alone possesses the secret key that made that signature. Forgery of a signed message is infeasible, and the sender cannot later disavow his signature. These two processes can be combined to provide both privacy and authentication by first signing a message with your own secret key, then encrypting the signed message with the recipient's public key. The recipient reverses these steps by first decrypting the message with her own secret key, then checking the enclosed signature with your public key. These steps are done automatically by the recipient's software. - -- Philip Zimmermann 3021 11th Street Boulder, Colorado 80304 303 541-0140 E-mail: [email protected] - -- [email protected] ======================================================================== Appendix V - The Philip Zimmermann Defense Fund. All articles reproduced by permission. ======================================================================== Evidently, providing "free crypto for the masses" has its down side. The government is investigating Phil Zimmermann, the original author of PGP, for alleged violations of the ITAR export regulations prohibiting the unlicensed export of cryptographic equipment. They do not seem to believe that Phil himself actually exported PGP; rather, they claim that making the program available in a way that it could be exported is itself export (such as giving it away without restriction). As of this writing, the investigation is just that. In January, Phil's lawyers met with the government lawyers to discuss the case. The outcome of the meeting is unclear at this point, though the meeting was described as "cordial" by Phillip Dubois, Phil Zimmermann's lawyer. Even though it's "just an investigation", it's been an expensive one. Phil immediately had to go out and get legal representation to try to combat this "investigation" and prepare for its possible result. He's got a really good legal team, and they have done a lot of their work pro bono in support of the cause. Unfortunately, there are still costs associated with legal fights like this one. Phil's got quite a bill so far. To help offset his costs, Phil and his legal team have set up a legal defense fund for contributions. It's currently way in the red, but it's better than paying the whole bill outright. If charges actually get filed, the total bill could soar up into the millions; not a fun thing to have happen to you after providing such a nice (if controversial) public service. And spending all these millions doesn't guarantee that he won't be convicted and spend some time in jail; that's something not even a legal defense fund can pay for. Several companies who benefit from the use of PGP have indicated that they will donate a portion of their profits from certain activities to the legal defense fund. Here is a partial list: First Virtual Holdings Incorporated Four11 Directory Services ViaCrypt Christopher Geib (the author of the shareware WinPGP) Additions to this list would be appreciated. More information can be had by sending E-mail to [email protected] or by visiting the information page set up for the fund: http://www.netresponse.com/zldf Also, the legal team has also asked that anyone who has been approached by a federal investigator and questioned about Phil Zimmermann please contact Phillip Dubois [[email protected], 303/444-3885, 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO 80304-4132]. Here's the original article announcing the fund: ===== - From [email protected] Thu Oct 14 23:16:32 1993 Return-Path: <[email protected]> Received: from ncar.ucar.edu by mail.netcom.com (5.65/SMI-4.1/Netcom) id AA05680; Thu, 14 Oct 93 23:16:29 -0700 Received: from sage.cgd.ucar.edu by ncar.ucar.EDU (5.65/ NCAR Central Post Office 03/11/93) id AA01642; Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:15:34 MDT Received: from columbine.cgd.ucar.edu by sage.cgd.ucar.EDU (5.65/ NCAR Mail Server 04/10/90) id AA22977; Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:14:08 MDT Message-Id: <[email protected]> Received: by columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU (4.1/ NCAR Mail Server 04/10/90) id AA09815; Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:16:57 MDT ~Subject: PGP legal defense fund To: [email protected] (Gary Edstrom) ~Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 0:16:56 MDT ~From: Philip Zimmermann <[email protected]> In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>; from "Gary Edstrom" at Oct 11, 93 1:13 pm ~From: Philip Zimmermann <[email protected]> ~Reply-To: Philip Zimmermann <[email protected]> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL0] Status: OR ~Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 02:41:31 -0600 (CDT) ~From: [email protected] (Hugh Miller) ~Subject: PGP defense fund As you may already know, on September 14 LEMCOM Systems (ViaCrypt) in Phoenix, Arizona was served with a subpoena issued by the US District Court of Northern California to testify before a grand jury and produce documents related to "ViaCrypt, PGP, Philip Zimmermann, and anyone or any entity acting on behalf of Philip Zimmermann for the time period June 1, 1991 to the present." Phil Zimmermann has been explicitly told that he is the primary target of the investigation being mounted from the San Jose office of U.S. Customs. It is not known if there are other targets. Whether or not an indictment is returned in this case, the legal bills will be astronomical. If this case comes to trial, it will be one of the most important cases in recent times dealing with cryptography, effective communications privacy, and the free flow of information and ideas in cyberspace in the post-Cold War political order. The stakes are high, both for those of us who support the idea of effective personal communications privacy and for Phil, who risks jail for his selfless and successful effort to bring to birth "cryptography for the masses," a.k.a. PGP. Export controls are being used as a means to curtail domestic access to effective cryptographic tools: Customs is taking the position that posting cryptographic code to the Internet is equivalent to exporting it. Phil has assumed the burden and risk of being the first to develop truly effective tools with which we all might secure our communications against prying eyes, in a political environment increasingly hostile to such an idea -- an environment in which Clipper chips and Digital Telephony bills are our own government's answer to our concerns. Now is the time for us all to step forward and help shoulder that burden with him. Phil is assembling a legal defense team to prepare for the possibility of a trial, and he needs your help. This will be an expensive affair, and the meter is already ticking. I call on all of us, both here in the U.S. and abroad, to help defend Phil and perhaps establish a groundbreaking legal precedent. A legal trust fund has been established with Phil's attorney in Boulder. Donations will be accepted in any reliable form, check, money order, or wire transfer, and in any currency. Here are the details: To send a check or money order by mail, make it payable, NOT to Phil Zimmermann, but to Phil's attorney, Philip Dubois. Mail the check or money order to the following address: Philip Dubois 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO USA 80304 (Phone #: 303-444-3885) To send a wire transfer, your bank will need the following information: Bank: VectraBank Routing #: 107004365 Account #: 0113830 Account Name: "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account" Any funds remaining after the end of legal action will be returned to named donors in proportion to the size of their donations. You may give anonymously or not, but PLEASE - give generously. If you admire PGP, what it was intended to do and the ideals which animated its creation, express your support with a contribution to this fund. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Posted to: alt.security.pgp; sci.crypt; talk.politics.crypto; comp.org.eff.talk; comp.society.cu-digest; comp.society; alt.sci.sociology; alt.security.index; alt.security.keydist; alt.security; alt.society.civil-liberty; alt.society.civil-disob; alt.society.futures - -- Hugh Miller | Asst. Prof. of Philosophy | Loyola University Chicago FAX: 312-508-2292 | Voice: 312-508-2727 | [email protected] PGP 2.3A Key fingerprint: FF 67 57 CC 0C 91 12 7D 89 21 C7 12 F7 CF C5 7E ===== European users of PGP may also make contributions to the fund, as described in the following message posted to alt.security.pgp. Note that this fund is not endorsed or managed by the people managing the real legal defense fund; it is intended as a medium for Europeans (and others) to be able to contribute to the fund easily. ===== - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a call for donations to support Philip Zimmermann, the author of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), directed especially to the european users. To avoid the large bank fees when transferring money to the United States or when issuing checks to overseas, I have established an european legal trust fund for your convenience. First of all, I'd like to inform you what this legal trust fund is all about in the first place. If you already know Phil's situation, you might skip the quoted message below. I am using parts of the "request for donations" as it was posted by Philip Dubois, Zimmermann's lawyer. | As you may already know, on September 14 LEMCOM Systems (ViaCrypt) | in Phoenix, Arizona was served with a subpoena issued by the US | District Court of Northern California to testify before a grand | jury and produce documents related to "ViaCrypt, PGP, Philip | Zimmermann, and anyone or any entity acting on behalf of Philip | Zimmermann for the time period June 1, 1991 to the present." | | Phil Zimmermann has been explicitly told that he is the primary | target of the investigation being mounted from the San Jose office | of U.S. Customs. It is not known if there are other targets. | Whether or not an indictment is returned in this case, the legal | bills will be astronomical. | | If this case comes to trial, it will be one of the most important | cases in recent times dealing with cryptography, effective | communications privacy, and the free flow of information and ideas | in cyberspace in the post-Cold War political order. The stakes are | high, both for those of us who support the idea of effective | personal communications privacy and for Phil, who risks jail for | his selfless and successful effort to bring to birth "cryptography | for the masses," a.k.a. PGP. Export controls are being used as a | means to curtail domestic access to effective cryptographic tools: | Customs is taking the position that posting cryptographic code to | the Internet is equivalent to exporting it. Phil has assumed the | burden and risk of being the first to develop truly effective tools | with which we all might secure our communications against prying | eyes, in a political environment increasingly hostile to such an | idea -- an environment in which Clipper chips and Digital Telephony | bills are our own government's answer to our concerns. Now is the | time for us all to step forward and help shoulder that burden with | him. | | Phil is assembling a legal defense team to prepare for the | possibility of a trial, and he needs your help. This will be an | expensive affair, and the meter is already ticking. I call on all | of us, both here in the U.S. and abroad, to help defend Phil and | perhaps establish a groundbreaking legal precedent. A legal trust | fund has been established with Phil's attorney in Boulder. If you wish to donate some money to Philip Zimmermann, you may now transfer it to an account here in Germany -- what is usually quite a lot cheaper than transferring it to overseas. Here is the information you will need: Account owner: Peter Simons Bank : Commerzbank Bonn, Germany Account No. : 1112713/00 Bank No. : 380 400 07 This is NOT my private account! It is only used to collect the donations for Philip. Every single dollar I receive will be transferred to the account in the States monthly, with minimum fees. If you donate any money, you might want to send an e-mail to me ([email protected]) and to Philip Dubois ([email protected]) to let us know. Sending a copy to Phil's lawyer will furthermore make sure that I can by no means keep anything for myself as he knows exactly what amount has been given. If you need any further information, please don't hesitate to contact me under [email protected] and I will happily try to help. You may get my PGP public key from any keyserver or by fingering [email protected]. Please be generous! Consider that PGP is completely free for you to use and Phil got nothing but trouble in return. One can easily imagine what a software company had charged you for a tool like that! Sincerely, Peter Simons <[email protected]> - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i beta iQCVAgUBL2YWuw9HL1s0103BAQEj9wP9EJwRtjcpCSCG/5p10rfPkgD3tlYs35ds HwXOlCdRkFSfVOQ70xhgObgf6iZwv/OFQzfjf83CjLt5CxVpROMvMBGLnJkpTYEJ JzXh/22O+E2guWMuGbDgoD83dPXbxWhPCqeJEIP1uNUaT4QQjxB8OOaCfpxLIbCa 2lnISYXKZuQ= =WrGh - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ======================================================================== Appendix VI - A Statement from ViaCrypt Concerning ITAR Reproduced by Permission ======================================================================== - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) includes a regulation that requires a manufacturer of cryptographic products to register with the U.S. State Department even if the manufacturer has no intentions of exporting products. It appears that this particular regulation is either not widely known, or is widely ignored. While no pressure was placed upon ViaCrypt to register, it is the Company's position to comply with all applicable laws and regulations. In keeping with this philosophy, ViaCrypt has registered with the U.S. Department of State as a munitions manufacturer. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLQ+DfmhHpCDLdoUBAQGa+AP/YzLpHBGOgsU4b7DjLYj8KFC4FFACryRJ CKaBzeDI30p6y6PZitsMRBv7y2dzDILjYogIP0L3FTRyN36OebgVCXPiUAc3Vaee aIdLJ6emnDjt+tVS/dbgx0F+gB/KooMoY3SJiGPE+hUH8p3pNkYmhzeR3xXi9OEu GAZdK+E+RRA= =o13M - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBL+kBF7nwkw8DU+OFAQEEWwP/S1EZ+HmzibikWKPDwkqSd4gXsDTM7Zu5 ePC0Pl0PwJoByXnrhDInMorD5oHSFf8mior+SRZubmgUq0plWhI1Ip5DUp+NYVbg k4Eah/P4q57mExNimBlWCwpb72yYs6HKL60eqEZzQP83DpVJ7VvA7bfMiggZLa1r Z8Nk1Nrwcc0= =I8Z9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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